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I.  INTRODUCTION 
May 26, 2011, marked the ten-year anniversary of the establishment of 
the African Union, and with the sudden death of Muammar al Gaddafi, who 
was instrumental in the creation of the African Union,1 the time is ripe to 
fully re-assess the ability of the African Union to ensure state compliance 
with the Constitutive Act of the African Union (Constitutive Act) and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).  The 
African continent has a long history of massive human rights abuses.  Prior 
to 2001, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was responsible for 
ensuring that African states complied with international law and respected 
the human rights of their citizens.2  Given the OAU’s many failures, 
including its inability to stop or prevent human rights violations, member 
states of the OAU elected to overhaul the OAU and establish the African 
Union on May 26, 2001.3  Previous writings by legal scholars on the African 
Union have generally concluded that the African Union, like its predecessor 
the OAU, has been unable to protect human rights in Africa or ensure state 
compliance with the democratic and human rights principles set forth in the 
African Charter.4 
This Article contributes to the body of scholarship on the effectiveness of 
the African Union by analyzing the African Union’s response to the political 
and humanitarian crises in Madagascar, Guinea-Conakry, Zimbabwe, Libya, 
and Kenya from both a realist and institutionalist perspective on state 
compliance with international law.  This Article argues that while the 
African Union’s handling of the crises in Madagascar and Guinea-Conakry 
indicates that the African Union is successfully providing incentives for its 
smaller and less powerful member states to comply with the Constitutive Act 
and the African Charter, the African Union’s ultimate resolution of the crisis 
in Zimbabwe and its feeble responses to the political turmoil in Libya and 
Kenya signal that the African Union continues to be plagued by a number of 
problems, including, but not limited to, the following: limited political will, 
failure to timely and uniformly impose sanctions, state reporting failures, and 
inadequately drafted governing instruments.  This Article will propose a 
number of solutions to these problems, such as revising the African Charter 
                                                                                                                                                       
 1 Paul Reynolds, African Union Replaces Dictators’ Club, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2002, 11:23 
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/2115736.stm (identifying Gaddafi as instrumental in 
a captioned photo). 
 2 Constitutive Act of the African Union, entered into force May 26, 2001, 2158 U.N.T.S. 
3, 33 [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act].   
 3 Corinne A.A. Packer & Donald Rukare, The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act, 
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 365, 374 (2002). 
 4 Id. at 377–78. 
78  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:75 
 
to eliminate claw-back clauses, amending the Constitutive Act, revising the 
protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council to remove the principle 
of equitable regional representation and rotation, better utilizing the African 
Union Commission on International Law, and revising the protocols 
establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II introduces the institutionalist 
and realist theories of state compliance with international law.  Part III 
establishes the applicable legal framework by addressing the history of the 
African regional human rights system and critiques the provisions of both the 
African Charter and the Constitutive Act.  By using the realist and 
institutionalist theories to review the African Union’s response to the 
political crises in Madagascar and Guinea-Conakry, Part IV analyzes the 
effectiveness of the African Union in ensuring state compliance with the 
provisions of the African Charter and the Constitutive Act.  Part V examines 
the African Union’s paltry reaction to the political crises in Zimbabwe, 
Libya, and Kenya from an institutionalist and realist perspective and 
analyzes the African Union’s inability to ensure that these countries comply 
with the principles contained in the African Charter and the Constitutive Act.  
Part VI unveils the problems the African Union continues to face in light of 
its response to the crises in Zimbabwe, Libya, and Kenya.  Part VI also 
proposes concrete legal solutions to enable the African Union to more 
effectively protect human rights in Africa and obtain member state 
compliance with the human rights and democratic principles set forth in the 
Constitutive Act and the African Charter. 
II.  THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While a number of individual theories provide a suitable basis for 
analyzing state compliance with international law, this Article combines the 
institutionalist and realist theories to ultimately produce a cohesive and 
unique paradigm to evaluate the African Union’s efficacy in obtaining 
member state compliance with the African Charter and Constitutive Act. 
A.  Institutionalist Perspective 
The institutionalist theory of state compliance with international law 
views states as rational actors that behave on the basis of self-interest.5  
According to institutionalists, membership in a regional human rights 
                                                                                                                                                       
 5 Catherine Powell, United States Human Rights Policy in the 21st Century in an Age of 
Multilateralism, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 421, 425 (2002). 
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system, which states join with the aim of setting a common standard of 
behavior, positively impacts a state’s perception of its self-interest by 
creating significant incentives to comply with the international rules and 
norms established by the regional human rights system.6  
Proponents of the institutionalist theory assert that the rules and norms 
established by institutions will reform a state’s decision-making process, 
thereby encouraging a state to cooperate by surrendering certain short-term 
goals in order to reap greater benefits of long-term gains.7  Additionally, 
according to institutionalists, human rights violations occur “when the 
conditions supporting compliance are absent or weak, that is, when 
international norms are ambiguous.”8  Thus, institutionalists believe that state 
compliance with the norms and rules of a human rights regime will be 
greatest in those regions of the world where human rights regimes are strong, 
such as in Western Europe.9  
Furthermore, institutionalists assert that state compliance with the norms 
established by a human rights regime can occur in a number of ways: 
[B]y rewarding states that develop reputations for adherence to 
international rules; by creating greater interdependence 
between states thereby raising the cost of cheating; by 
increasing the amount of available information to ensure 
effective monitoring of adherence and early warning of 
cheating; and by reducing the transaction costs of individual 
agreements, thereby making cooperation more profitable for 
self-interested states.10 
In essence, the rules and norms of a human rights regime increase the 
likelihood of a state’s transformation from frequently cheating for its own 
self-interest to instead choosing cooperation in pursuit of long-term gains.  In 
the human rights context, monitoring mechanisms may be established in the 
founding documents of the human rights regime (e.g., state reporting 
procedures).  Alternatively, they may be established on an ad hoc basis to 
monitor and resolve specific political and humanitarian crises in 
noncompliant countries (e.g., international contact groups).11  Additionally, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 6 See id. (explaining that human rights systems or institutions minimize the non-
cooperative element of self-interest called cheating). 
 7 Id. at 426.  
 8 Sonia Cardenas, Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights 
Pressure on State Behavior, 6 INT’L STUD. REV. 213, 220 (2004).  
 9 Id. at 217.  
 10 Powell, supra note 5, at 426–27. 
 11 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Making Human Rights a 
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institutionalists argue that institutions “can promote cooperation in the 
absence of a common . . . or . . . formal govern[ment] . . . by providing ‘a 
stable environment for mutually beneficial decision-making as they guide 
and constrain behavior.’ ”12  International institutions, such as the African 
Union, bestow upon participating members the ability to create long-term 
relationships, effectually eliminating mere short-term relationships that are 
void of incentives to cooperate.  For instance, under the direction of the 
African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
was established in an effort to promote democracy in Africa and increase 
economic integration and peace and security among African countries.13  In 
connection with the creation of NEPAD, the African Union also created a 
peer review mechanism that utilizes principles of self-monitoring, mentoring, 
and guidance in the hopes of promoting good governance and socioeconomic 
integration in African countries.14  Moreover, institutionalists emphasize 
“inducing, rather than persuading or coercing, decision makers to comply 
with international norms as the best means of protecting and promoting 
human rights.15  In fact, “[r]ather than applying punitive sanctions, advocates 
of this liberal position assume that greater economic openness will spill over 
into increasing political reform . . . [and that] trade provides greater 
opportunities for societal contact and an exchange of democratic [and human 
rights] ideas. . . .”16 
B.  Realist Perspective 
The realist perspective assumes international anarchy and purports that a 
state will comply with international law only when compliance is in the 
state’s self-interest.17  Thus according to realists, a rational state actor will 
                                                                                                                                                       
Reality: The Human Rights Mechanisms (Feb. 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Abo 
utUs/IK_HR_mechanisms_En.pdf. 
 12 William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. 
U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 242 (1997) (quoting Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and 
International Institutions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 121, 127 (1996)). 
 13 See generally African Union, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 16–21 
(Oct. 2001), available at http://www.uneca.org/nepad/Media-Dialogue/NEPAD_Framework 
_Document.pdf (outlining the purpose and goals of NEPAD). 
 14 Org. of African Unity Assembly of Heads of State & Gov’t, The New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD): The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), §§ 1–2, 4, 
AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex II.  For a detailed discussion on the African peer review system, 
see Okezie Chukwumerije, Peer Review and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa, 32 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 49 (2006). 
 15 Cardenas, supra note 8, at 217. 
  16 Id. 
 17 MARKUS BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 96–99 
(2005). 
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not abide by a treaty or the norms and rules established by a human rights 
regime when doing so would not be in the state’s self-interest.  In fact, 
realists question the efficacy of international institutions such as human 
rights regimes and posit that individual states, not international institutions, 
are the key actors in international relations.18  Further, traditional realists 
argue that “a state commits an action because it advances its national interest 
but it does not need to claim that the national interest itself serves to justify 
international acts.”19  
In contrast to the institutionalist theory, the underpinnings of the realist 
theory derive from the notion that states are rationally seeking to increase 
two vital components—power and security.20  According to realists, the 
important factor influencing state compliance with international law is the 
power of a state relative to the other states that are parties to a particular 
human rights regime.21  Therefore, the extent to which a state’s behavior 
conforms to international law mainly depends on a state’s political, 
economic, and military power in comparison to its neighboring states or the 
human rights regime, not on the norms and rules established by the 
governing human rights regime.22  According to realists, “[w]eaker 
governments ‘accept international obligations because they are compelled to 
do so by great powers.’ ”23  Moreover, realists “expect human rights 
violations to be pervasive, given that it is not in most states’ material 
interests to attach sufficiently high costs to noncompliance.”24  Thus, 
according to realists, military intervention and sanctions are often necessary 
to coerce a recalcitrant state into compliance.25  
It should be noted that, in general, the realist perspective focuses mainly 
on the role of individual states in international politics rather than on the 
actions of international institutions, such as human rights regimes.26  
                                                                                                                                                       
 18 Jack Snyder, One World, Rival Theories, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 59; see 
also Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and 
the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1832, 1842 (2002) (noting realists’ lack of concern for international organizations, which do 
not impose constraints on hegemonic states).  
 19 BURGSTALLER, supra note 17, at 97. 
 20 See id. at 97–98 (describing realist theories that focus on security and power). 
 21 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation 
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 221 (2000) (discussing the effect hegemonic power 
dynamics have on human rights regimes). 
 22 BURGSTALLER, supra note 17, at 96. 
 23 Helfer, supra note 18, at 1842 (quoting Moravcsik, supra note 21, at 221).  
 24 Cardenas, supra note 8, at 219. 
 25 Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Institutional 
Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1131, 
1139–40 (2006).   
 26 Snyder, supra note 18; see also Helfer, supra note 18, at 1895 (assessing realist theory). 
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However, the concepts of state security, power, self-interest, coercion, and 
sanctions, all of which underlie the realist theory, play an instrumental role in 
understanding international politics and state compliance with international 
law.  As such, this Article will utilize the concepts underlying the realist 
perspective—state security, power, self-interest, coercion, and sanctions—to 
analyze the actions of the African Union and propose solutions to better aid 
the African Union in obtaining state compliance with the African Charter and 
Constitutive Act. 
The evolution of the institutionalist and realist theories of state 
compliance with international law has afforded scholars a potent tool for 
analyzing international relations and determining the efficacy of regional 
human rights systems. However, these theories are not immune from 
criticism and neither theory alone can definitively and conclusively account 
for all factors that may impact or determine state compliance with 
international law.  Therefore, this Article seeks to combine both the realist 
and institutionalist theories to utilize a wider range of factors that may 
predict member state compliance, and thereby, comprehensively determine 
whether the African Union has successfully obtained member state 
compliance with the African Charter and Constitutive Act. 
III.  AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND 
CRITIQUE 
Established in 1963, the OAU had as its main goal the elimination of 
colonization in Africa and the promotion of unity and solidarity among 
African states for the betterment of its peoples.27  Absent from the OAU 
Charter, however, was an explicit statement of the OAU’s role in protecting 
the human rights of the African citizenry.28  The absence of this provision 
would lay the foundation for the OAU’s failure to prevent or stop the human 
rights violations later committed by abusive African states and rebel fighters.  
Of course, with the exception of a few international conventions adopted 
prior to 1963—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention 
                                                                                                                                                       
 27 G. Aforka Nweke, The Organization of African Unity and Intra-African Functionalism, 
489 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 133, 134, 138 (1987). 
 28 See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 
reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: BASIC DOCUMENTS AND 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 28 (M. Hamalengwa et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter OAU Charter].  
It should be noted that the preamble of the OAU Charter affirmed the OAU’s commitment to 
the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Universal Declaration), and Article II, Section 1(e) of the OAU Charter provided that 
the OAU must promote international cooperation with due regard to the UN Charter and the 
Universal Declaration.  Id. at pmbl., art. 2, § 1(e).  However, those were the only references to 
the term “human rights” in the OAU Charter.  See id. 
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on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees—neither the United Nations 
(UN) nor leading western countries had adopted many of the modern 
international conventions and treaties that recognize and guarantee human 
rights.29  In fact, most of the international conventions and international 
human rights treaties recognized today were adopted after 1965.30  For 
example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination was adopted in 1965, and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights was adopted in 1966.31  Therefore, 
one cannot fault the OAU’s thirty-two founding countries32 for failing to 
specifically include a human rights provision in the OAU Charter when most 
Western countries and the UN were not primarily focused on the protection 
of human rights at that time.  Moreover, at the time of the OAU’s creation, 
its founding countries may have viewed colonialism and apartheid in South 
Africa as the most pressing human rights concerns in Africa.  Thus, while the 
OAU had many failures, which will be discussed later in this section, the 
OAU arguably achieved success in two main areas: (a) the elimination of 
colonization in Africa and (b) the elimination of apartheid in South Africa.  
Article II, Section 1(d) of the OAU Charter provided that a preeminent 
objective of the organization was “to eradicate all forms of colonialism from 
Africa.”33  Undoubtedly, the OAU successfully achieved this goal.  The 
organization not only took advantage of Cold War tensions, but also 
provided diplomatic support to African countries and galvanized the world 
                                                                                                                                                       
 29 The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights on December 10, 1948.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).  The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on December 9, 1948.  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948).  The Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
July 28, 1951.  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150. 
 30 See International Law, OFF. UN HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr. 
org/english/law/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
 31 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
was adopted on December 21, 1965.  Id.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights was adopted on December 16, 1966.  Id.  The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights was adopted on December 16, 1966.  Id.  The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was adopted on December 18, 
1979.  Id. 
 32 S. Afr. Dep’t of Int’l Relations & Cooperation, Organization of African Unity 
(OAU)/African Union (AU), INT’L REL. & COOPERATION, http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multil 
ateral/Africa/oau.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
 33 OAU Charter, supra note 28, art. 2, § 1(d). 
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community and the UN into actions aimed at ending colonialism.34  For 
example, the OAU established a sanctions bureau to further implement 
economic boycotts of African states controlled by European powers.35  It also 
created a coordinating committee of African states to assist liberation 
movements in colonial states.36  As a result of the OAU’s diplomacy, along 
with the wars fought by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique in 
Mozambique and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola in 
Angola, Portugal was forced to grant independence to Mozambique in 1974 
and to Angola in 1975.37  There were only thirty-two independent African 
states when the OAU was founded in 1963.38  However, due to the 
organization’s multifaceted efforts, many more African states were able to 
gain independence, and the OAU was composed of fifty-three independent 
African states by its overhaul in 2001.39  
The OAU also played a critical role in ending apartheid in South Africa.  
Through its many efforts, the African Union successfully excluded South 
Africa from international organizations such as the ILO, UNESCO, FIFA, 
the International Olympic Movement, and most notably, the UN General 
Assembly.40  In 1977 the OAU, along with the UN, organized an 
antiapartheid world conference; there, with approximately 112 governments 
participating, the Lagos Declaration for Action Against Apartheid was 
adopted.41  Further, the OAU successfully lobbied the UN and its member 
states to adopt sanctions against South Africa.42  Although the people of 
South Africa played a central role in the destruction of apartheid, the OAU, 
through its diplomatic efforts, figured significantly in the eradication of 
apartheid. 
Despite the OAU’s success in eliminating colonialism in Africa and 
apartheid in South Africa, on the whole, the OAU generally failed to fully 
shield African peoples from abusive states, and in fact, many have argued 
that the OAU “exist[ed] only for the protection of African Heads of State.”43  
                                                                                                                                                       
 34 See generally GEORGE WILLIAM MUGWANYA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: ENHANCING 
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 173–81 (2003) 
(describing the success of the OAU). 
 35 Godfrey L. Binaisa, Organization of African Unity and Decolonization: Present and 
Future Trends, 432 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 58 (1977). 
 36 Id. at 59. 
 37 MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 174–75. 
 38 Id. at 174.  
 39 AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2. 
 40 MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 175. 
 41 Id. at 177. 
 42 Id. at 177–78. 
 43 Yassin El-Ayouty, An OAU for the Future: An Assessment, in THE ORGANIZATION OF 
AFRICAN UNITY AFTER THIRTY YEARS 179, 179 (Yassin El-Ayouty ed., 1994). 
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The inability of the OAU to address human rights needs was due in part to 
abuse of the noninterference clause found in Article III, Section 2 of the 
OAU Charter.44  This clause, which promoted noninterference in the internal 
affairs of states as a major principle, was used by heads of state to shield 
their human rights abuses from outside interference.45  Once a state labeled 
its actions or those of its citizens as “internal affairs,” the OAU was 
powerless to intervene.46  A 1979 statement by the then President of Guinea-
Conakry, Sekou Toure, aptly illustrates the problem. President Toure 
claimed that “the OAU was not ‘a tribunal which could sit in judgement on 
any member state’s internal affairs.’ ”47  This belief, it seems, was 
widespread among many OAU heads of state, and as a result, the 
organization was unable to hold recalcitrant states accountable for human 
rights violations.  For example, in 1963, Burundi pleaded with the OAU to 
prevent and stop the massacre of Tutsis, but the organization failed to act, 
and in 1972 and 1973, the OAU failed to prevent the murder of thousands of 
Hutus in Burundi.48  The OAU again sat dormant as Equatorial Guinea’s then 
president, Francisco Marcias Nguema, committed human rights atrocities 
that eventually forced almost 1.5 million Equatorial Guineans to flee the 
country.49  Moreover, the OAU proved unable to prevent or end the massacre 
of over 300,000 Ugandans under Idi Amin’s deadly eight-year rule.50  Even 
after the OAU adopted the African Charter, the OAU continued to prove 
incapable of protecting the human rights of African peoples, and it failed to 
obtain member state compliance with the human rights principles contained 
in the African Charter.  For example in 1994, the OAU could not thwart the 
massacre of approximately 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu.51  
Similarly, the OAU failed to prevent the reported genocides that occurred in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi in 1996.52  
                                                                                                                                                       
 44 MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 182. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id.; see also U.O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 902, 902–03 (1983) (noting the limited authority members imposed upon 
themselves). 
 48 MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 182.  The OAU generally failed to intervene in human 
rights abuses, as most African leaders believed that foreign criticism of their actions violated 
the non-interference clause contained in the OAU Charter.  Id. 
 49 Olusola Ojo & Amadu Sesay, The O.A.U. and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s 
and Beyond, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 89, 92 (1986). 
 50 AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1979, at 37–38 (Amnesty Int’l 
Publ’ns 1979). 
 51 MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 55. 
 52 Id. 
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As a result of the many failures of the OAU, and in an effort to mimic the 
success of the European Union (EU), the member states of the OAU, with 
the support of Gaddafi, elected to replace the OAU with the African Union in 
2000.53  Gaddafi submitted a proposal for the creation of an African Union as 
early as 1999 and he re-affirmed this idea at an African summit meeting in 
Togo in 2000.54  It should be noted, however, that while many have credited 
Gaddafi with the creation of the African Union, evidence suggests that there 
were other African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah, who advocated for the 
creation of the African Union as early as the 1960s.55  
The African Union was created to ultimately fulfill many of the goals of 
the OAU.  As such, the African Union has incorporated many of the 
principles and purposes previously stated in the OAU Charter.  Some of 
these inherited objectives include achieving unity and solidarity between 
African peoples, defending sovereignty and territorial integrity of member 
states, promoting and defending common African positions, encouraging 
international cooperation, and having due regard for the UN Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.56  
The African Union has also retained many of the organs of the OAU.  In 
some instances the names of the bodies or institutions were changed, but 
nonetheless, their functions have remained the same.  For example, as a 
replacement to the Office of the Secretary General, the African Union 
established the Commission of the Union and the Office of the Chairman.57  
The African Union has preserved the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Union (Assembly) as the supreme organ of the union,58 
with most powers of the Assembly specifically mandated in the Constitutive 
Act.  Article 9 of the Constitutive Act provides that the Assembly may direct 
the executive council on the management of wars and conflicts, monitor the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 53 See Lome Declaration, AHG/Decl.2(XXXVI) (July 12, 2000) (recording considerations 
that lead to support for the AU model); Transition from the OAU to the African Union: Design 
of the African Union, AFR. UNION SUMMIT, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_ 
to_au.htm (last updated July 2, 2002) (noting intent to mimic the EU). 
 54 See Lome Declaration, supra note 53 (declaring support for an African Union); see also 
Sirte Declaration, EAHG/Draft/Decl.(IV) Rev. 1 (Sept. 9, 1999) (recording decisions based on 
Gaddafi’s proposals including the decision to establish an African Union).  
 55 Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in 
Postcolonial Africa, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 157, 161 (2003).  
 56 Compare AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 3, with OAU Charter, supra note 28, 
art. 2. 
 57 Compare AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 20, with OAU Charter, supra note 28, 
art. 16.  
 58 Packer & Rukare, supra note 3, at 375. 
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implementation of policies and compliance by member states, and determine 
the common policies of the African Union.59   
A.  Constitutive Act 
Perhaps the most notable norm change under the African Union is the 
newly placed restriction on the OAU’s noninterference clause.  Article 4(h) 
of the Constitutive Act now limits a state’s ability to abuse the 
noninterference clause by permitting the African Union to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a member state in “grave circumstances, namely[ ] war 
crimes, genocide[,] and crimes against humanity.”60  Theoretically then, 
heads of state can no longer use the noninterference clause as a shield against 
accountability for human rights violations.  Additionally, Articles 4(o) and 
4(p) of the Constitutive Act indicate that the African Union is obligated to 
condemn and reject unconstitutional changes of government and political 
assassinations.61  Similarly, Article 3(g) of the Constitutive Act provides that 
the African Union must “promote democratic principles and institutions, 
popular participation and good governance.”62  Article 30 of the Constitutive 
Act provides that states that come to power through unconstitutional means 
will have their membership in the African Union suspended.63  Moreover, 
Article 23 of the Constitutive Act permits the African Union to impose 
appropriate sanctions, including political and economic sanctions, in the 
event that a member state fails to comply with the decisions and policies of 
the African Union as determined by the Assembly.64  In accordance with 
Section 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, the African Union established the Peace 
and Security Council of the African Union (Peace and Security Council) via 
the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union (Council Protocol).65  The Peace and Security Council 
is primarily responsible for the peaceful resolution of African conflicts and 
one of its goals is to ensure the protection of human rights in Africa.66  Part 
VI of this Article will critique certain provisions of the Council Protocol and 
will propose amendments to the Council Protocol to ensure state compliance 
with the democratic principles of the Constitutive Act. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 59 AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 9. 
 60 Id. art. 4(h). 
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 63 Id. art. 30. 
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There are a number of provisions contained in the Constitutive Act that 
should be revised to more effectively ensure state compliance with the 
principles contained in the Constitutive Act and African Charter.  First, 
Article 6, Section 3 of the Constitutive Act provides that the Assembly need 
only convene once per year; however, upon the request of a member state 
and two-thirds majority approval of the member states, the Assembly must 
meet in an extraordinary session.67  The Assembly is the supreme organ of 
the African Union and is responsible for monitoring the implementation of 
the principles of the Constitutive Act and the decisions of the African 
Union.68  Moreover, the Assembly has the power to suspend states that come 
to power through unconstitutional means.69  Additionally, Article 7 of the 
Council Protocol provides that the Peace and Security Council has the power 
to recommend intervention by the Assembly pursuant to Article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act,70 which permits the Assembly to intervene in a country in 
the event of crimes against humanity and grave circumstances.71  Given the 
frequency of political crises in Africa and the Assembly’s main role in the 
African Union, in conjunction with its extensive powers, the Assembly 
should be required to meet and address issues regarding compliance more 
than once per year. 
In practice, the Assembly generally meets at least twice per year.72  
Although the Peace and Security Council is authorized to meet as frequently 
as may be required and already plays an instrumental role in resolving 
African conflicts, the Assembly is the head of the African Union and is the 
organ best equipped to exercise the powers granted under the Constitutive 
Act.  In fact, once the Peace and Security Council renders a decision or 
provides a recommendation, the Assembly then has the power to express its 
support for the implementation of these decisions and recommendations, a 
fact that may have additional benefits for implementation.  For example, on 
October 20, 2011, the Peace and Security Council authorized the creation of 
an AU Liaison Office in Libya to address the Libyan crisis.73  However, the 
next scheduled meeting of the Assembly was not until January 30, 2012, and 
it was at this meeting that the Assembly expressed its support of the Peace 
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and Security Council’s recommendation by requesting that the African 
Union Commission accelerate the process of establishing an AU Liaison 
Office in Libya to monitor the situation in Libya.74  Thus, despite the 
meetings of the Peace and Security Council, the Assembly should meet more 
frequently, at the very least to more expediently express official support for 
the decisions of the Peace and Security Council.75  
In contrast to the provisions of the Constitutive Act, which obligate the 
Assembly to meet only once per year and require a two-thirds majority in 
order to hold an extraordinary session of the Assembly,76 Article 237 of the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) provides that the Council of the EU must meet whenever 
convened by the president on his own initiative or at the request of one of its 
members or the European Commission.77  Moreover, Article 15 of the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty) provides 
that members of the European Council, another EU organ, must meet at least 
twice every six months to discuss the political priorities of the EU.78  In order 
to ensure that the Assembly meets frequently enough to timely respond to 
political crises, Article 6, Section 3 of the Constitutive Act should be revised 
to mimic the provisions contained in Article 237 of the TFEU, Article 15 of 
the EU Treaty, or both.  However, unlike the African Union, the EU is well 
funded.  Thus, one must acknowledge the logistical difficulties, including 
increased financial costs that the African Union may face due to more 
frequent meetings of the Assembly.  Given the frequency of political and 
humanitarian crises in Africa (Guinea-Bissau and Mali being the most 
recent79), such increased costs may be insignificant and well incurred in light 
of the African Union’s long-term goals of protecting human rights and 
increasing political stability and democracy in Africa. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 74 Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security 
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Second, Article 6, Section 4 of the Constitutive Act provides that “[t]he 
Office of the [Chairperson] of the Assembly shall be held for a period of one 
year . . . after consultations among Member States.”80  The Constitutive Act 
contains no guidance regarding the standards that should be used to elect the 
chairperson of the Assembly.  President Boni Yayi of Benin was recently 
elected to serve as the chairperson of the Assembly.81  However, prior to 
President Boni’s election, President Mbasogo, long-ruling dictator of 
Equatorial Guinea, served as chairperson.82 Similarly, Gaddafi, the former 
dictator of Libya, also previously served as chairperson of the Assembly.83  
To prevent the election of dictators who fail to respect human rights and 
democracy, Article 6, Section 4 of the Constitutive Act should be revised to 
specifically provide that the office of chairperson of the Assembly shall be 
held only by heads of state with a consistent track record of promoting 
democracy and human rights in their respective countries.  Moreover, from 
an institutionalist perspective, human rights violations occur when the norms 
of the human rights regime are ambiguous.84  The chairman of the supreme 
organ of the African Union must be ready to lead by example, thereby 
signaling to member states clear norms regarding the protection of human 
rights and the promotion of democracy. 
Third, although Article 7 of the Constitutive Act provides some guidance 
regarding the decisions of the Assembly, it fails to impose a timeliness 
requirement on the Assembly’s issuance and communication of its decisions. 
Article 7, Section 1 of the Constitutive Act provides that the Assembly must 
“take its decisions by consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of 
the Member States . . . . However, procedural matters, including the question 
of whether a matter is one of procedure or not, shall be decided by a simple 
majority.”85  Given the African Union’s slow and meager response to the 
political crises in Libya and Kenya (discussed in detail in Part V of this 
Article), there needs to be some provision in the Constitutive Act whereby 
the Assembly is required to timely make and convey its decisions.  
Moreover, Article 59 of the African Charter provides that all measures 
adopted by the African Commission “shall remain confidential until such 
time as the Assembly” authorizes the dissemination of such measures.86  
                                                                                                                                                       
 80 AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 6(4). 
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Thus, the Assembly’s lack of timeliness impacts not only decisions made by 
the Assembly but also decisions rendered by the African Commission.  As 
such, Article 7, Section 1 of the Constitutive Act should be amended to 
provide that the Assembly must make its decisions in a timely manner and 
must communicate its decisions within ten days of reaching a consensus or, 
failing that, a two-third majority of member states. 
Fourth, while Article 14, Section 1(b) of the Constitutive Act establishes 
a committee on monetary and financial affairs,87 absent from the Constitutive 
Act is a provision which directly addresses the budget and financing for the 
organs of the African Union.88  From a realist perspective, the extent to 
which a state will comply with the norms of a human rights regime depends 
on the power of the state in comparison to the political and economic power 
of the human rights regime.89  Thus, the African Union must have the 
economic power to pressure recalcitrant states to comply with the principles 
of the African Charter and Constitutive Act.  Article 23, Section 1 of the 
Constitutive Act provides that member states that default on their payment 
obligations to the African Union may be denied “the right to speak at 
meetings, to vote, . . . or to present candidates for any position or post within 
the [African] Union.”90  However, in practice it appears that either the 
African Union has been inconsistent at utilizing Article 23, Section 1 to force 
member states to meet their financial obligations to the African Union, or the 
suspension of member benefits is not an effective sanctioning tool to 
engender compliance with respect to paying membership dues.  If the latter is 
true, additional methods of enforcement may be needed in order to force 
member states to pay their membership dues.  As recently as July 1, 2011, 
the African Union has acknowledged that it has continued to face budgeting 
and financial issues due to member states’ failure to pay their dues.91  It has 
been reported that Gaddafi paid membership dues on behalf of a number of 
African states that were delinquent in their financial obligations to the 
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African Union.92  Despite Gaddafi’s payment of membership dues for other 
member states, the African Union continued to struggle with budgetary 
issues.93  With Gaddafi’s death it is unlikely that these states will continue to 
receive aid from Libya in paying membership dues to the African Union. 
Moreover, in contrast to the Constitutive Act, which although modeled 
after the EU fails to provide details on budgetary issues, Part Six, Title II of 
the TFEU specifically addresses financing and budgeting issues in detail.  
For example, Article 310 of Title II of the TFEU provides that “[a]ll items of 
revenue and expenditure of the [EU] shall be included in estimates to be 
drawn up for each financial year and [must] be shown in the budget,” and 
that “the revenue and expenditure shown in the budget must be in balance.”94  
Further, institutionalists argue that vague or unclear norms lead to state 
noncompliance and human rights violations.95  The African Union does not 
file an annual report, lacks an independent audit authority, and the details of 
the annual budget are not publicly disclosed—in contrast to the many 
financial disclosures made by other international organizations such as the 
UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).96  
The African Union must amend the Constitutive Act to ensure that its 
founding document clearly establishes the rules and norms regarding not 
only general financing and budgeting issues, but also member state financing 
obligations.  Additionally, the African Union must adopt measures to 
improve financial transparency in its operations. 
Fifth, Article 23, Section 2 of the Constitutive Act should be revised to 
clearly provide for the imposition of political and economic sanctions in the 
event of a violation of the human rights and democratic principles contained 
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in the Constitutive Act, the African Charter, or any other convention, 
protocol, or instrument adopted by the African Union.  Currently, Article 23, 
Section 2 of the Constitutive Act provides that “any Member State that fails 
to comply with the decisions and policies of the [African] Union may be 
subject to economic” and political sanctions.97  The term policies is not 
defined in the Constitutive Act.  Thus, it is unclear as to whether polices may 
be deemed to include the democratic and human rights principles referenced 
in the Constitutive Act, the African Charter, or other instruments such as the 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which contains 
expansive provisions regarding unconstitutional changes in government as 
discussed in Part VI.B of this Article.  In practice, it appears that the African 
Union has either interpreted the term policies to include violations of the 
African Charter or rendered sanctions after a “decision” has been made by 
the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.98  However, from an 
institutionalist perspective, norm ambiguity leads to human rights violations 
and clear norms can bolster the strength and efficacy of a human rights 
regime.99  Therefore, Article 23 should be revised to clearly indicate that 
economic and political sanctions will be automatically issued not only for a 
state’s failure to comply with the decisions and policies of the African 
Union, but also for violations of the democratic and human rights principles 
contained in any instrument adopted by the African Union, including but not 
limited to, the African Charter and the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance.  Additionally, Article 30 of the Constitutive Act 
should be revised to provide, not only that a state’s membership in the 
African Union be suspended if the state comes to power through 
unconstitutional means, but also that the state will automatically face 
economic and political sanctions.  Moreover, as discussed in Part VI.A of this 
Article, the African Union has repeatedly failed to impose sanctions on 
recalcitrant states in a timely manner.  Thus, from a realist perspective, in 
order to pressure states to comply with the democratic and human rights 
principles of the African Charter and Constitutive Act, Article 23 and 
Article 30 of the Constitutive Act should be revised to provide that the 
Assembly must issue sanctions no later than thirty days after an 
unconstitutional change in government, as defined in the African Charter on 
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Democracy, Elections and Governance.100  Part VI.A of this Article provides 
a detailed discussion regarding the efficacy of sanctions. 
B.  African Charter 
The newly created African Union retained the African Charter, which was 
adopted, by member states of the OAU in 1981.101  The African Charter 
recognizes a broad array of fundamental human rights of both individuals 
and groups.  For example, Article 3 provides that “[e]very individual shall be 
equal under the law” and is entitled to equal protection under the law.102  
Article 4 contains a broad recognition of respect for human life and the 
integrity of a person and further provides that no person shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his right to life.103  Article 10 provides for the right of free 
association,104 while Article 13 provides that every individual has “the right 
to participate freely in the government of his [or her] country.”105  Article 23 
of the African Charter provides that an individual is entitled to international 
and national peace and security,106 and Article 30 establishes the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission).107  The 
African Commission is responsible for promoting and protecting the human 
rights principles contained in the African Charter.108  Pursuant to Article 42, 
Section 2 of the African Charter, the African Commission has established 
rules of procedure, which govern its operations.109  As discussed in detail 
below, despite the many fundamental human rights guaranteed by the 
African Charter, it contains a number of claw-back clauses and fails to 
include a specific right to vote.  Moreover, certain rules of procedure adopted 
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by the African Commission may impede the African Union’s ability to 
obtain state compliance as discussed in Part VI.C of this Article. 
Claw-back clauses permit states to restrict the rights established by the 
African Charter.  For example, Article 8 of the African Charter provides for 
the freedom of conscience, and the free practice of religion; however, these 
rights are subject to “law and order.”110  Article 9 of the African Charter 
grants every individual the right to express and disseminate opinions, 
provided that such opinions are “within the law.”111  Article 12 of the African 
Charter guarantees each individual the right to leave any country, including 
his or her own, and to return to his or her country; however, this right is 
subject to restrictions established by African states for the protection of 
“national security, law and order, public health or morality.”112  Similarly, 
although Article 14 guarantees the right to property, this right “may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the 
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws” 
established by African states.113  In short, the claw-back clauses allow 
African governments to remove or restrict the human rights established by 
the African Charter.  
The African Commission has indicated that it will take an expansive 
approach, turning to international human rights law when interpreting 
African Charter provisions, including the claw-back clauses.114  That is, the 
African Commission has stated that the claw-back clauses must be 
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with international law and the 
protection of human rights.  Nevertheless, the existence of the claw-back 
clauses allows heads of state to justify human rights violations through the 
use of state law, and it may signal to recalcitrant member states that the 
African Commission “condone[s] infringements of human rights norms as 
long as it is done through domestic law.”115  Therefore, there is a pressing 
need for the African Union to revise the African Charter to remove the claw-
back clauses. 
For example, in a 1988 case the African Commission noted that the 
Government of Zambia incorrectly relied on the claw-back clause of Article 
12(2) of the African Charter when the government blocked a number of 
individuals from returning to Zambia.116  The African Commission stated that 
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the claw-back clauses in the African Charter should not be used to give 
credence to violations of the human rights principles set forth in the African 
Charter.117  The African Commission ultimately recommended that Zambia 
allow the individuals in question to return to Zambia.118  If the African 
Charter is revised to remove the claw-back clauses, there would be no need 
for the African Union to continually remind states that the claw-back clauses 
should not restrict the human rights guaranteed by the African Charter.  
Moreover, institutionalists posit that human rights violations occur when a 
human rights regime is weak and is unable to provide unambiguous norms 
and rules for its member states to follow.119  The African Union must revise 
the African Charter to remove the claw-back clauses in order to eliminate 
ambiguity regarding the utilization of the claw-back clauses. 
A number of African states have incorporated similar claw-back clauses 
into their respective constitutions. For example, Equatorial Guinea’s 
constitution provides that individuals have the right to freedom of expression 
and freedom of association; however, such rights are subject to legislative 
provisions establishing conditions under which those rights may be 
exercised.120  President Mbasogo’s restrictions on freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly in Equatorial Guinea have been well documented.121  
The African Union cannot with a “straight face,” condemn countries such as 
Equatorial Guinea, for abusing the claw-back clauses contained in their 
respective constitutions, when the founding document that establishes and 
guarantees human rights in Africa—the African Charter—contains expansive 
claw-back provisions.  Therefore, as the organization that is responsible for 
protecting human rights in Africa, the African Union should revise the 
African Charter to remove the claw-back clauses in order to send a strong 
message to countries such as Equatorial Guinea, that violations of human 
rights through the use of claw-back clauses will not be tolerated.  
It should be noted that while claw-back clauses are contained in a number 
of international instruments, the claw-back clauses set forth in other 
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instruments are not as sweeping as some of the claw-back clauses contained 
in the African Charter.  For example, Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that the right to freedom of 
expression is subject to restrictions “[f]or the respect of the rights or 
reputations of others [and] [f]or the protection of national 
security[,] . . . public order . . . , or of public health or morals.”122  In contrast, 
Article 9 of the African Charter grants every individual the right to express 
and disseminate opinions, provided that such opinions are “within the 
law.”123  Under the African Charter, African leaders may simply enact a law 
to prevent freedom of expression and arguably still be in compliance with the 
terms of the African Charter.  In contrast, under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, a state may only enact laws that limit the right 
to freedom of expression if those laws are narrowly tailored to address the 
rights of others, national security, public order, or public health.  As such, at 
a minimum the broad claw-back clauses contained in the African Charter 
should be more narrowly tailored. 
Another solution that may aid the African Union in ensuring member 
state compliance with democratic principles is to revise Article 13 of the 
African Charter.  Currently, Article 13 of the African Charter provides that 
“[e]very citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the Government 
of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in 
accordance with the provisions of the law.”124  While Article 13 arguably 
provides support for the democratic process in member states, it does not 
specifically provide that each individual in each member state has the right to 
vote and cast a ballot to elect the leaders of his or her country.  The “one 
person, one vote” concept is integral to the democratic process and the 
proper functioning of a truly democratic country.  Sham elections where the 
“one person, one vote” concept has been ignored have led to the repeated 
election of President Mugabe and President Mbasogo.  To better promote 
democracy in African states, the African Charter should ensure that every 
African citizen has the right to vote and not just the right to participate in the 
political process according to the law of the individual member state.125  
                                                                                                                                                       
 122 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), art. 19, 21 
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 123 African Charter, supra note 86, art. 9. 
 124 Id. art. 13.  
 125 Article 4, Section 2 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance  
provides that member states must “recognize popular participation through universal suffrage as 
the inalienable right of the people.”  Democratic Charter, supra note 100, art. 4(2).  Arguably, 
the use of the term “universal suffrage” may be deemed to include the principle of “one person 
one vote”; however, to date, this charter has only been ratified by fifteen member states.  African  
Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on  
Democracy, Elections and Governance, EISA (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/ 
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Additionally, Article 62 of the African Charter requires member states to 
submit biennial reports “on the legislative or other measures taken with a 
view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recogni[z]ed and guaranteed 
by the present [African] Charter.”126  As of 2007, eighteen member states 
have yet to submit biennial reports to the African Union.127  As of May 2010, 
Madagascar, Kenya, and Guinea-Conakry have each submitted only one state 
report since ratification of the African Charter.128  Similarly, Zimbabwe and 
Libya have only submitted three reports to the African Union.129  Moreover, 
Equatorial Guinea, the country of the former chairman of the African Union, 
has never submitted a state report.130  Institutionalists posit that a human 
rights regime can encourage member state compliance with its norms and 
rules by increasing the amount of available information to ensure effective 
monitoring and early warning of noncompliance.131  If member states 
complied with the state reporting requirements, the African Union would be 
better able to gauge state compliance with the human rights and democratic 
principles contained in the African Charter and Constitutive Act.  From a 
realist perspective, member states should be motivated to make reporting a 
priority by the implementation of sanctions or other penalties for failure to 
submit timely and high quality reports.  The lenient approach currently taken 
by the African Commission communicates to member states that the 
submission of timely and accurate reports is not important.  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that many member states do not place a high priority on their 
state reporting obligations.  The African Commission should review all 
reports and provide member states recommendations, as well as sanction 
states for their failure to timely comply with the reporting requirements of 
Article 62 of the African Charter.  Moreover, Article 62 of the African 
Charter should be revised to specifically provide that the African Union will 
automatically issue economic and political sanctions against member states 
that fail to adequately comply with the state reporting procedures in a timely 
manner.  
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 126 African Charter, supra note 86, art. 62.  See generally Takele Soboka Bulto, Beyond the 
Promises: Resuscitating the State Reporting Procedure Under the African Charter on Human 
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While African states should be lauded for adopting the African Charter, 
which recognizes the fundamental human rights of both individuals and 
groups, recognizing the existence of such rights is only the first step in 
assessing the effectiveness of a regional human rights system.  An effective 
human rights regime not only recognizes fundamental human rights but also 
protects them by holding recalcitrant member states accountable for 
violations.132  
IV.  AU RESPONSE IN MADAGASCAR AND GUINEA-CONAKRY 
The following section provides an overview of, and analyzes the African 
Union’s response to, the political crisis in Madagascar from both 
institutionalist and realist perspectives on state compliance with international 
law.  
A.  Madagascar 
On March 17, 2009, the president of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana, 
was forced to turn over power of the country to the military, and over 135 
people were injured or killed in riots.133  It is clear that the killing of these 
civilians was in violation of Article 4 of the African Charter, which provides 
that “[e]very human being [is] entitled to respect for his life and the integrity 
of his person.”134  The dispute between Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina 
arose after Rajoelina was elected in 2007 as the mayor of Antananarivo, the 
capital of Madagascar.135  Ravalomanana unilaterally shut down Rajoelina’s 
television station, VIVA, after Rajoelina broadcast an interview with former 
                                                                                                                                                       
 132 While this Article focuses on the Constitutive Act and the African Charter, member 
states have adopted a number of other human rights instruments that are part of the larger 
African human rights regime.  See, e.g., Democratic Charter, supra note 100; Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000), entered into force Nov. 25, 2005; African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, concluded July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5; OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, entered into force Dec. 6, 2002, 
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/OAU-english.pdf (stating the conviction 
that terrorism is a serious breach of human rights); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999.  These 
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democracy, women’s rights and children’s rights.  This Article does not seek to determine the 
efficacy of the African Union in obtaining member state compliance with these other 
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 133 LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40448, MADAGASCAR’S POLITICAL CRISIS 1 
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 134 African Charter, supra note 86, art. 4. 
 135 OTTILIA MAUNGANIDZE, INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, MADAGASCAR: ANATOMY OF A 
RECURRENT CRISIS 2 (2009). 
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President Didier Ratsiraka that was extremely critical of Ravalomanana.136 
This action was clearly in violation of Article 9 of the African Charter, which 
provides that “[e]very individual shall have the right to express and 
disseminate his opinions within the law.”137  On March 17, 2009, one of the 
presidential palaces was stormed and taken over by the Malagasy army.138  
The military then appointed Rajoelina, Ravalomanana’s political rival, as the 
leader of the government.  Madagascar’s constitutional court deemed the 
transfer of power valid.139  This judgment was in stark violation of Article 26 
of the African Charter, which requires each member state to guarantee the 
independence of its national courts and refrain from restricting the 
establishment of national institutions that promote and protect the human 
rights guaranteed by the African Charter.140 
The African Union immediately responded to the political crisis in 
Madagascar by issuing a statement deploring the loss of life caused by the 
political uprising and holding talks with the relevant members of 
Madagascar’s government.141  Further, the African Union responded by 
invoking Article 30 of the Constitutive Act, which provides that 
“[g]overnments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means 
shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.”142  In 
accordance with Article 30 of the Constitutive Act, the Peace and Security 
Council of African Union suspended Madagascar from the African Union 
and directed Rajoelina’s administration to take concrete steps towards 
returning the country to constitutional order.143  Chairperson Jean Ping then 
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 137 African Charter, supra note 86, art. 9.  The African Commission has found that “[t]he 
intimidation and arrest or detention of journalists for articles published and questions asked 
deprives not only the journalists of their rights to freely express and disseminate their 
opinions, but also the public, of the right to information” and violates Article 9 of the African 
Charter.  Jawara v. Gam., African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 147/95, 
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 138 MAUNGANIDZE, supra note 135, at 1. 
 139 Id.  
 140 African Charter, supra note 86, art. 26. 
 141 Press Release, African Union, Chairperson Ping Presents the African Union Position on the 
Sudan / Chad Relationship and the Situation in Madagascar, AU Press Release 38/2009 (Jan. 30, 
2009), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/2009/January/summit/Press 
_Releases.html; see also Communiqué, Statement of Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African 
Union Comm’n (Feb. 3, 2009) (noting stated willingness of the conflicting parties to dialogue), 
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/2009/January/summit/Press_Relea 
ses.html. 
 142 MAUNGANIDZE, supra note 135, at 4 (citing AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 30). 
 143 Id.; see also African Union, Communiqué of the 181st Meeting of the Peace and Security 
Council, ¶ 4, Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(CLXXXI) (Mar. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Communiqué 
181st Meeting] (issuing suspension until restoration of constitutional order).  
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lobbied for the establishment of an international contact group to ensure that 
the international community established a common position on returning 
constitutional order to Madagascar.144  
The institutionalist theory provides that membership in an institution such 
as a regional human rights system facilitates cooperation by encouraging 
states to adhere to the norms and principles of the institution.145  The African 
Union appears to have employed an effective institutionalist approach when 
the organization supported the creation of the International Contact Group on 
Madagascar (ICGM)146 in order to resolve the crisis and obtain Madagascar’s 
adherence to the rights guaranteed by the African Charter and the democratic 
principles recognized in the Constitutive Act.  Additionally, from an 
institutionalist perspective, the African Union appears to have appealed to 
the merits of belonging to a human rights institution to force behavioral 
change in Madagascar.147  With the aid of the ICGM, members of the rival 
Malagasy political camps met in Maputo on August 8th and 9th, 2009 and 
adopted the Charter of the Transition, the Maputo Political Agreement and 
the Charter of Values Agreement, known collectively as the “Maputo 
Agreements.”148  The Maputo Agreements provided for a peaceful transition 
to democracy that would occur over a fifteen month period and further called 
for the establishment of a “Government of National Unity,” a body to be 
comprised of twenty-eight ministers, a prime minister, and three deputy 
prime ministers.149  
Through utilization of the ICGM, and as a result of the Maputo 
Agreements and a subsequent meeting held in Addis Ababa, the Peace and 
Security Council established a monitoring mechanism and an assessment 
mission which collaborated with other international actors, such as the UN, 
to evaluate Madagascar’s electoral needs.150  As previously noted in Part II.A 
                                                                                                                                                       
 144 See Press Release, Statement by Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission (Apr. 7, 2009) (denoting that the African Union “initiated consultations for the 
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 145 Powell, supra note 5, at 426–27. 
 146 African Union, Press Statement of the 211th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 
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of this Article, institutionalists posit that state compliance with the norms 
established by a human rights regime can occur through the establishment of 
effective systems for monitoring a country’s adherence to the norms of the 
human rights regime and providing early warning of cheating and 
noncompliance with these norms.  Arguably, implementation of the ICGM 
expedited resolution of the crisis because the contact group and the Peace 
and Security Council has monitored the transition process and has demanded 
that democratic elections occur with transparency and credibility, consistent 
with the Maputo Agreements.151  To some extent, the ICGM, a monitoring 
mechanism encouraged by institutionalists, compelled Rajoelina to take steps 
to return Madagascar to constitutional order,152 thereby, encouraging state 
compliance with the democratic norms and principles contained in the 
African Charter and Constitutive Act.  Moreover, this monitoring mechanism 
stabilized the political crisis between Ravalomanana’s supporters and 
Rajoelina’s supporters.153  Additionally, the ICGM encouraged the rivaling 
parties to comply with the provisions of the Maputo Agreements, and it 
continues to attempt to resolve ongoing disputes between the parties through 
the contact group’s systematic and orderly dispute resolution process.154  
As noted in Part II.B of this Article, from the realist perspective, states are 
more inclined to cooperate when it serves their self-interest to comply.  Thus, 
a state is more likely to adhere to international law when the costs of 
cheating (i.e., noncompliance with international obligations), are higher than 
the benefits the state would reap from noncompliance.  In response to 
Rajoelina’s refusal to adhere to the Maputo Agreements, the African Union 
imposed a number of sanctions against Raejolina including freezing his 
assets and issuing travel bans against him and approximately 108 of his 
supporters.155  The African Union also suspended Madagascar from 
                                                                                                                                                       
 151 See LAUREN PLOCH & NICOLAS COOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40448, MADAGASCAR’S 
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 152 African Union, Press Statement of the 202nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 
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 154 Press Release, Council of the European Union, 13th Africa–EU Ministerial Troika 
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participation in the African Union.156  These targeted sanctions remain a 
classic tool endorsed by realists and serve to punish cheaters in hopes of 
deterring future misconduct.157  In theory, issuance of sanctions such as 
freezing assets and travel bans will discourage states from cheating and 
noncompliance because the costs and consequences of such sanctions are far 
more detrimental than any benefits gained through noncompliance.  This 
realist instrument may have been successful in contributing to resolution of 
the unrest in Madagascar because shortly after the African Union imposed 
sanctions against Rajoelina and his supporters, the Madagascar leader chose 
to cooperate with the international community.158 
Article 13 of the African Charter provides that “[e]very citizen shall have 
the right to participate freely in the Government of his country, either 
directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the 
provisions of the law.”159  Article 4(m) of the Constitutive Act provides that 
the African Union must ensure member state “respect for democratic 
principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.”160  By 
establishing the ICGM and levying sanctions when faced with 
noncompliance by Madagascar’s rival political camps, the African Union 
took one step closer toward ensuring Madagascar’s compliance with the 
principles of democracy and respect for human life set forth in Article 13 of 
the African Charter and Articles 4(m) and 4(o) of the Constitutive Act. 
Parliamentary and presidential elections in accordance with the Maputo 
Agreements were scheduled for April 13, 2011 and July 1, 2011; however, 
the elections have been postponed numerous times.161  Nevertheless, on 
December 8, 2011, the Peace and Security Council expressed its intention to 
remove the sanctions placed on Madagascar upon submission by the 
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Southern African Development Community (SADC) of a report confirming 
satisfactory progress in the implementation of the Maputo Agreements.162  
The situation in Madagascar is ongoing, and the African Union must 
continue its efforts to effectively resolve the crisis and return Madagascar to 
constitutional order in accordance with the African Charter and Constitutive 
Act.  Currently, presidential elections in Madagascar are scheduled for May 
8, 2013, and parliamentary elections are scheduled for July 3, 2013.163  Only 
time will tell whether these elections will occur. 
The following section discusses the political unrest that has unfolded in 
Guinea-Conakry and analyzes the African Union’s response to the turmoil 
from the institutionalist and realist perspectives of state compliance with 
international law. 
B.  Guinea-Conakry 
On December 23, 2008, the National Council for Democracy and 
Development (CNDD) seized power in Guinea-Conakry (Guinea) via 
military coup, named military captain Moussa Dadis Camara acting 
president, and promised to hold democratic presidential and legislative 
elections.164  However, CNDD soon dissolved the government and suspended 
the constitution in violation of Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act165 and 
Articles 11 and 13 of the African Charter.166  Camara seemed intent to run for 
president in the future scheduled elections, sparking thousands of Camara 
oppositionists to peacefully demonstrate.167  On September 28, 2009, police 
and militia forces released tear gas and fired at civilian demonstrators, killing 
approximately 150 people and injuring many more.168  Such actions were in 
clear violation of the respect for life, freedom of expression, and freedom of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 162 African Union, Communiqué of the 303rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 
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association principles set forth in Articles 4, 9, and 10 of the African Charter, 
respectively.169 
In response to Guinea’s violations of the democratic and human rights 
principles set forth in the African Charter and the Constitutive Act, the 
African Union condemned the unconstitutional change of government and, in 
conjunction with ECOWAS and the UN Security Council, formed the 
International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), to provide an efficient 
resolution of the crisis.170  The ICG-G, with the support of the Peace and 
Security Council, pledged to resolve the political crisis in Guinea and held 
discussions led by Blaise Compaoré, the President of Burkina Faso, to begin 
a dispute resolution plan for Guinea.171  The ICG-G’s main objective was to 
establish free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections in Guinea.172  
As previously noted in Part II.A of this Article, institutionalists argue that a 
human rights regime can obtain state compliance with the norms and rules it 
creates by establishing effective monitoring systems to prevent the political 
crises that may lead to a state’s noncompliance with human rights norms.  
Arguably, institutionalists would encourage the establishment of councils, 
such as the ICG-G, that serve as monitoring mechanisms to evaluate and 
resolve political crises and to ensure state compliance with norms.  
Therefore, the measures taken by the African Union are consistent with the 
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ws_and_events/au/icgg/ (last updated Sept. 2, 2009) (cataloging information primarily related 
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elections). 
106  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:75 
 
institutionalist approach, where several states and institutions combine their 
resources to guide states toward adherence to all applicable norms and rules.  
In accordance with Article 30 of the Constitutive Act,173 on December 29, 
2008, the African Union suspended Guinea and threatened further sanctions 
unless the soldiers who seized power restored constitutional order.174  The 
Peace and Security Council, in conjunction with ICG-G, informed Camara 
that his government would face sanctions if he failed to provide by October 
17, 2009, assurances that neither he nor his associates in CNDD would 
participate in future presidential elections.175  When Camara refused to 
comply with the African Union’s request, the Peace and Security Council 
released a statement on October 29, 2009, indicating that it would “take all 
the necessary measures towards the implementation of targeted sanctions, 
including denial of visas, travel restrictions and freezing of assets.”176  The 
realist theory posits that states are more inclined to adhere to international 
law when compliance furthers their self-interests.177  As previously discussed 
in Part II.B of this Article, realists frequently endorse the imposition of 
targeted sanctions because realists argue that a state is more likely to comply 
with international law when the calculation of compliance is economically 
beneficial.  Thus, if the costs of compliance with international law are lower 
than the significant sanctions and high financial costs a state would incur 
from failure to comply with international law, realists argue that a rational 
state will choose cooperation and compliance in order to avoid the economic 
loss.178  In the Guinean crisis, the African Union threatened to impose 
sanctions against Camara if he failed to provide assurances that he would not 
participate in upcoming presidential elections.  When Camara refused to 
comply with the African Union’s request, the Peace and Security Council 
implemented sanctions including denial of visas, travel restrictions and 
freezing of assets.  Following the imposition of such sanctions, Camara 
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the “Camara Requirements.” 
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Doc. PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CCVII) (Oct. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Communiqué 207th Meeting]. 
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ultimately complied with the African Union and other international actors, in 
large part because he could not practically remain in power without these 
sanctions being lifted.179  Additionally, after a failed assassination attempt on 
Camara, on December 3, 2009, Camara quickly resigned to recover in 
Burkina Faso.180  
In response to Camara’s resignation, General Sekouba Konaté was 
appointed interim president of the National Transition Council, the acting 
interim power in Guinea.181  On January 15, 2010, with the help of the ICG-
G, Guinea’s leaders signed a joint declaration agreement in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou Agreement), which established a 155-member 
transitional government led by Prime Minister Jean-Marie Doré.182  Further, 
the Ouagadougou Agreement stipulated that presidential and parliamentary 
elections would occur within six months of the signed agreement and 
reiterated that Camara, Konaté, and other CNDD members could not 
participate in the elections.183  After the transitional government took power, 
it continued to comply with the requests and regulations of the African 
Union.  From a realist perspective, the transitional government’s continued 
compliance with the requests and regulations of the African Union are 
explained by the presence of consequences, such as isolation from the 
African Union and the International community coupled with other 
sanctions, that would have been contrary to the state’s self-interest and 
detrimental to the overall power and economy of Guinea. 
With the support of the international community and the ICG-G, 
presidential elections occurred on June 27, 2010, in the first open election in 
Guinea’s history.184  Despite a few isolated reports of violence during 
campaigning, the citizens of Guinea finally enjoyed an overall peaceful 
election devoid of harassment or severe injury.185  Consistent with the 
institutionalist perspective’s support of monitoring mechanisms that observe 
and audit state compliance with applicable norms, rules, and agreements, the 
ICG-G, for a time, continued to monitor the political crisis in Guinea to 
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Ouagadougou Agreement.186  
Pursuant to the previously signed Ouagadougou Agreement, neither Camara 
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nor his associates participated in the presidential elections, and on November 
15, 2010, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) 
announced Alpha Condé as the new president of Guinea.187  As an additional 
sign of progress, in February 2012 a Guinean court filed charges against 
Camara for the mass rapes and killings of civilians that occurred in 2009.188  
These charges provide evidence that Guinea’s courts are becoming more 
independent and more willing to hold human rights violators such as Camara 
accountable as required by Article 26 of the African Charter, which requires 
“the independence of the courts” of each member state and “the promotion 
and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the [African] 
Charter.”189  The African Union’s persistent and attentive response to the 
political turmoil in Guinea serves as evidence that the organization may be 
overcoming some of the problems of its predecessor, the OAU.  Further, the 
resolution of the crisis in Guinea indicates that the African Union has the 
ability to ensure state compliance with the democratic and human rights 
principles set forth in the African Charter and Constitutive Act.  
The African Union’s response to the political and humanitarian turmoil in 
Madagascar and Guinea suggests that the African Union is successfully 
attempting to play a vital role in the resolution of the political disputes that 
oftentimes lead to human rights violations in Africa.  However, perhaps the 
African Union’s relative success in Madagascar and Guinea190 is due in part 
to a pressing need to address potential human rights violations as well as 
unconstitutional changes of government that come about due to coup d’états. 
In attempting to resolve such crises, the African Union is not only concerned 
with state compliance with the Constitutive Act and the African Charter, but 
also with state compliance with other relevant instruments that address 
unconstitutional changes of government.  For example, both the Charter 
Protocol and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
address the African Union’s role in resolving unconstitutional changes in 
governments.191 
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V.  AU RESPONSE IN ZIMBABWE, LIBYA, AND KENYA 
Despite its relative achievements in countries such as Guinea, the African 
Union nonetheless is unable to consistently obtain member state compliance 
with the African Charter and Constitutive Act, as evidenced by the African 
Union’s handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its feeble response to the 
political crises in Libya and Kenya.  This section first explores the African 
Union’s response to the 2008 political crisis in Zimbabwe, followed by an 
evaluation of the African Union’s paltry reaction to the violent uprisings in 
Libya and the 2007 political crisis in Kenya.    
A.  Zimbabwe 
The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), led 
by Robert Mugabe, has been the major power in Zimbabwe since 1980.192  
The opposition group Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed 
during a period of economic decline in the 1990s and was lead by Morgan 
Tsvangirai.193  In March 2007, police assaulted opposition members in 
Zimbabwe in violation of the freedom of association and freedom of 
assembly principles set forth in Articles 10 and 11, respectively,194 of the 
African Charter, prompting South African President Thabo Mbeki to mediate 
talks between the Government of Zimbabwe and the MDC in order to 
establish a framework for democratic elections.195  
In the months leading up to the elections, reports revealed that 1,775 
incidents of political violence occurred196 in violation of the respect-for-life 
and security-of-a-person principles set forth in Articles 4 and 6 of the 
African Charter, respectively, and Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act.197  
The results of the election, which were not announced until five weeks later, 
indicated that opposition leader Tsvangirai had received more votes than 
incumbent President Mugabe; however, Tsvangirai had still failed to attain 
the requisite 50% to secure the presidency.198  Overall, President Mugabe’s 
first attempt at holding a democratic election was highly scrutinized for its 
numerous inconsistencies and was generally characterized as failing to 
constitute a true “free and fair” election in violation of the democratic 
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principles set forth in Article 13 of the African Charter and Article 4(m) of 
the Constitutive Act.199 
Following the election results, violent political unrest increased 
exponentially.  One report from the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for 
Human Rights indicated that the violence at the time “[was] on such a scale 
that it [was] impossible to properly document all cases.”200  Additionally, 
many reports suspected a trend of violence and torture predominantly against 
supporters of the MDC opposition group.201  Such actions of violence and 
torture are in clear violation of Article 5 of the African Charter, which 
provides in part that “all forms of exploitation and . . . degrading punishment 
and treatment shall be prohibited.”202  One specific report from Amnesty 
International further indicated that medical institutions often refused to treat 
the victims and militia teams attacked humanitarian groups offering 
assistance to victims.203  Article 16 of the African Charter provides that 
member states must ensure that their citizens receive adequate medical 
attention.204  Thus, the inability of Zimbabwe’s government to ensure that 
medical institutions provided adequate care to victims of the political crisis 
constitutes a violation of Zimbabwe’s obligation under Article 26 of the 
African Charter to promote and protect the rights guaranteed by the African 
Charter.205 
In response to the violence in Zimbabwe, the Assembly endorsed 
President Mbeki as the facilitator of mediation efforts between the rivaling 
parties and called upon the SADC to establish a monitoring mechanism 
designated to ensure resolution of the political crisis.206  The African Union 
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entrusted the SADC to lead the peacekeeping efforts but continued to 
monitor the situation by retaining a position in the reference group, which 
consisted of the SADC, the African Union, and the UN.207  On September 15, 
2008, under the guidance of the SADC and Mbeki, the ZANU-PF and MDC 
parties agreed to establish a “Government of National Unity” via the 
execution of the Global Political Agreement of Zimbabwe.208  This 
agreement stipulated that President Mugabe would continue as the President 
of Zimbabwe and Tsvangirai would hold the Office of Prime Minister.209  
Moreover, once the competing political parties had agreed to the 
Government of National Unity, the Assembly and Chairman Jean Ping 
encouraged the United States and the EU to remove their sanctions against 
Zimbabwe in order to assist the country in rebuilding its economy.210  
Consistent with the institutionalist approach, the African Union worked 
together with other regional and international actors to encourage the rivaling 
political parties in Zimbabwe to reach an agreement.  As discussed in Part 
II.A of this Article, institutionalists believe that human rights regimes can 
impact the behavior of their member states by encouraging adherence to the 
regime’s established norms, rules, and procedures.  From an institutionalist 
perspective, the African Union systematically restored order to Zimbabwe by 
collaborating with other organizations including the SADC and the UN to 
collectively influence Zimbabwe’s political leaders to form a Government of 
National Unity.  Moreover, the African Union’s collaboration with other 
international actors and the appointment of President Mbeki to mediate talks, 
which ultimately resulted in Zimbabwe’s cooperation with the international 
community, strongly evidences the efficacy of the institutionalist theory.  In 
essence, the African Union was a key player in effectuating the dispute 
resolution process and restoring order to Zimbabwe, while simultaneously 
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altering the state’s behavior and enabling Zimbabwe to realize the benefits of 
cooperation.  
However, despite the African Union’s success, from an institutionalist 
perspective, in brokering a peace deal that ended the political crisis in 
Zimbabwe via the efforts of President Mbeki, it is notable that Mugabe was 
allowed to remain in power.  Mugabe has controlled Zimbabwe for almost 
thirty-two years.211  Article 4(m) of the Constitutive Act clearly provides that 
the African Union should respect democratic principles.212  By allowing 
Mugabe to remain in power, the African Union is clearly failing to operate in 
accordance with the terms of its founding documents.  Furthermore, Mugabe 
has a long track record of human rights abuses.  For example, in 2006 the 
African Union condemned Mugabe’s forceful eviction of citizens from their 
homes in violation of the human rights principles contained in the African 
Charter.213  The Assembly’s decision to support the terms of the SADC’s 
Global Political Agreement of Zimbabwe,214 a power sharing agreement that 
permitted Mugabe to remain in power despite his lack of respect for human 
rights and democracy,215 evidences the African Union’s limited political will 
and that it may be following in the footsteps of its predecessor the OAU.  
From an institutionalist perspective, the African Union was successful to 
the extent that, it was able to convince Mugabe and Tsvangirai to execute a 
peace agreement that ended the 2008 political crisis.216  However, the African 
Union did not obtain Zimbabwe’s full compliance with the democratic 
principles of the African Charter and Constitutive Act because Mugabe was 
allowed to remain in power in violation of these principles.  Arguably, 
governments of national unity may not be a real solution to the lack of 
democratic governance in a particular country.  In some instances, as was the 
case in Zimbabwe, governments of national unity may simply lead to a 
convenient co-optation of the opposition.  This co-optation process may 
allow leaders who are unwilling to subject themselves to the full force of 
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democracy to perpetuate their power by either placating the opposition or 
essentially destroying the opposition.  The leaders of Zimbabwe and Kenya217 
tried to placate political opponents who were cheated through sham elections 
by offering a national unity government.  However, in many cases the end 
result is not a unity government, but a cobbling together of two groups with 
different political philosophies.  Thus, governments of national unity may 
simply be political “marriages of convenience”218 that are used to 
immediately “solve” a current crisis, but that fail to address the underlying 
reasons for the crisis. As a result, the underlying problem eventually 
reemerges.  For example, in Zimbabwe, President Mugabe intends to run for 
re-election in 2012, despite opposition from rival political camps.219  
Therefore, it appears that the long-term solution is to embrace democracy in 
its fullest form rather than permitting leaders like Mugabe to remain in 
power under the auspices of a government of national unity. 
As discussed in detail in Part II.B of this Article, realists posit that 
rational state actors calculate their decisions based on maximizing two of the 
most prominent state interests—power and security.  It follows that state 
leaders may cheat, or choose a path of noncompliance, if disregarding 
international laws furthers such state interests.  To deter this misconduct and 
encourage compliance, realists suggest utilizing targeted sanctions, such as 
travel bans and freezing assets, against states and leaders that fail to comply 
with international law.220  The African Union did not impose sanctions 
against Zimbabwe.221  The EU and the United States have both implemented 
targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe.222  In fact, on February 15, 2012, the 
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EU elected to maintain its sanctions against Zimbabwe despite Mugabe’s 
fervent opposition to these sanctions.223  One suggestion to improve the 
efficacy of the African Union as a whole, which will be discussed in further 
detail in Part VI of this Article, is to encourage the African Union to timely 
and uniformly impose sanctions against states who fail to comply with the 
principles set forth in the African Charter and the Constitutive Act.  As 
demonstrated by the Zimbabwe situation, the African Union’s failure to 
implement sanctions against deserving political leaders weakened the 
legitimate aims of the African human rights regimes.  The imposition of 
sanctions by the African Union, in addition to the sanctions that were already 
issued by the EU and the United States, might have provided an additional 
incentive for Mugabe to relinquish power.   
While it is evident that the African Union should have done much more to 
effectively resolve the situation in Zimbabwe, the historical and political 
situation in Zimbabwe may shed some light on the African Union’s inability 
to remove Mugabe from power.  The African Union was probably cognizant 
of the fact that the leaders of some African countries sympathize with 
Mugabe’s policy of expropriation of land from white settlers, and these 
leaders may in fact have bought into Mugabe’s characterization of his 
political rivals (the MDC) as lackies of Western neocolonialist powers.224  
Moreover, it is well known that Mugabe was vocal in opposing apartheid in 
South Africa.225  As a result, some leaders view Mugabe as a comrade in 
arms in the historic fight against apartheid and colonization.226  Thus, South 
Africa’s reluctance in pushing for Mugabe’s ouster, and former President 
Thabo Mbeki’s apparently biased mediation in favor of Mugabe, are 
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probably a result of Mugabe’s historical position against apartheid.  As such, 
the African Union’s lack of success in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis may 
be due in part to the African Union’s overreliance on President Mbeki’s role 
as SADC mediator to Zimbabwe. 
Similarly, from a realist perspective, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act 
authorizes the African Union to intervene in the affairs of a country in grave 
circumstances such as crimes against humanity and genocide.227  Arguably 
the African Union should have invoked Article 4(h) to intervene in 
Zimbabwe and remove Mugabe, who has a long history of human rights 
abuses, from power.  However, this would have essentially amounted to 
regime change in Zimbabwe, and as discussed in Part V.B of this Article, 
member states of the African Union have decried regime change in other 
countries, such as Libya, as attacks on Africa’s right to self-determination.  
Perhaps the African Union’s inability to effectuate regime change in 
Zimbabwe is due not only to a lack of political will or the historical and 
political situation in Zimbabwe, but also to a lack of resources228 and 
complications resulting from additional players with different political 
agendas, such as the SADC.229  Furthermore, regime change may be easier 
said than done, as exemplified by the problems that some powerful nations 
are facing in Iraq, a country where regime change was externally imposed,230 
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and in Syria, a country that may in the future be subject to externally 
imposed regime change.231 
B.  Libya 
Gaddafi led Libya’s 1969 revolution against the Libyan monarchy four 
decades ago, and while Gaddafi always insisted that he maintained no formal 
governmental position, his authoritarian leadership controlled the country 
until his death in 2011.232  Gaddafi’s forty-year authoritarian leadership was 
clearly in violation of Article 13 of the African Charter, which provides that 
every individual has “the right to participate freely in the government of his 
country, either directly or [indirectly] through freely chosen 
representatives.”233  Additionally, Gaddafi’s long rule of Libya was also in 
violation of the democratic principles contained in the Constitutive Act, more 
specifically, Articles 3(g) and 4(m).234  Further, the 2009 U.S. Department of 
State report on human rights in Libya labeled the country’s human rights 
record as “poor,”235 and provided that the country faced “[c]ontinuing 
problems includ[ing] reported disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment, lengthy pretrial and sometimes incommunicado detention, 
official impunity, and poor prison conditions.”236  Despite Gaddafi’s tainted 
past, the African Union nonetheless elected him to serve as chairman of the 
African Union in 2009 for a one-year term.237  Gaddafi had long-standing ties 
to the African Union.  In fact, Gaddafi typically receives credit in full as the 
driving force behind the establishment of the African Union, which 
culminated in the Sirte Declaration at the fourth extraordinary session of the 
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OAU in 1999.238  Gaddafi had also provided significant financial 
contributions to the African Union since its inception in 2000.239  
On February 15, 2011, pro-democracy protests marked the beginning of a 
violent uprising against Gaddafi.240  Libyan security forces opened fire on 
opposition activists and chaos ensued, allegedly escalating until attacks on 
secure locations prompted Libyan forces to fire with heavy weaponry.241  
Such confrontations between government authorities and the opposition 
caused the deaths and likely severe injuries of several unarmed protestors in 
violation of the right to life and liberty principles set forth in Articles 4 and 6 
of the African Charter.242  Ultimately, the opposition created an Interim 
Transitional National Council that sought international recognition as a 
formal, organized body and alternative to the Gaddafi regime.243  In an 
attempt to quell the escalating opposition, Gaddafi loyalists reportedly fired 
on crowds and protestors.244  This reckless response by the Gaddafi regime 
contributed to the estimated 30,000 people who were killed.245  With Libya 
on the brink of civil war, regional and international actors intervened. 
Deliberations among participating nations resulted in a demand for Gaddafi’s 
immediate departure, yet Gaddafi refused to relinquish power.246  The 
International Criminal Court later issued arrest warrants for Gaddafi, one of 
his sons, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and his head of military intelligence, 
Abdullah al-Senussi.247  
The UN Security Council requested that Gaddafi’s government adhere to 
Resolution 1973 (UN Resolution 1973), a proposition that necessitated “an 
immediate cease-fire, . . . declare[d] a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, . . . and 
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authorize[d] member states ‘to take all necessary measures . . . to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.’ ”248  While the 
Assembly acknowledged the need for an immediate cease-fire in Libya as 
required by UN Resolution 1973,249 the Assembly rejected foreign military 
intervention and instead encouraged peaceful resolution of the Libyan 
conflict.250  Arguably, there may be a causal connection between the African 
Union’s lack of response and the significant monetary contributions made by 
Gaddafi to the African Union each year.  The sum of Libya’s annual 
membership dues, along with the dues of several poorer countries paid by 
Gaddafi, amounts to an estimated $40 million per year.251  Moreover, the 
former Libyan leader had billions of dollars at his disposal for further 
potential contributions.252  The paraphrased statement of one analyst, 
Delphine Lecoutre of the French Center for African Studies at Addis Ababa 
University, stated that “even leaders who find [Gaddafi]’s behavior 
repugnant [still] fear his wrath if the [African Union] should anger him.”253  
Thus, it appears that the African Union may have failed to support 
international intervention in Libya because the organization feared Libya 
would withdraw from the African Union or terminate its financial 
contributions in the event that sanctions were imposed on the country.  
Although the fact that Gaddafi made financial contributions to the African 
Union is well-known, the extent of, and the African Union’s reliance on, 
these contributions may be grossly overstated.  Based on the African Union 
formula for contributions of each respective country, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, 
Nigeria, and South Africa each contribute 15% towards the African Union’s 
annual budget.254  Therefore, it could be argued that Gaddafi held the same 
amount of power over the African Union as did Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, and 
South Africa.  Additionally, though Gaddafi often agreed to host special 
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meetings of the African Union at his expense in Libya,255 he also hosted 
similar meetings for the Arab League256 and the Community of Sahelian and 
Sahara States (CEN-SAD)257 without any suggestion that he was controlling 
the countries of the Arab League or CEN-SAD.  Furthermore, Gaddafi was 
well-known for interfering in African conflicts by providing financing to 
various rebels in countries such as Liberia,258 Sierra Leone,259 Chad, Niger, 
Mali, and Uganda.260  Thus, many African heads of state may in fact have 
had their own grievance with Gaddafi and may not have been Gaddafi’s so-
called little minions, as many have argued.261   
Additionally, many have argued that South Africa and the African Union 
failed to support military action in Libya because Gaddafi allegedly 
supported the African National Congress (ANC), thus allowing the ANC to 
ultimately end apartheid in South Africa.262  However, according to former 
President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, this “support” was fictitious:  
[T]he incontrovertible fact is that during [apartheid], Libya did 
not give the ANC even one cent, did not train even one of our 
military combatants, and did not supply us with even one 
bullet.  This is because Gadaffi’s Libya made the determination 
that the ANC was little more than an instrument of Zionist 
Israel, because we had among our leaders such outstanding 
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patriots as the late Joe Slovo.  Libya came to extend assistance 
to the ANC after 1990, when it realised that the ANC was a 
genuine representative of the overwhelming majority of our 
people.263   
There is a growing concern in the African Union that Africa’s right to self-
determination, which was acknowledged in the UN’s Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,264 is not only 
being encroached upon by a lack of respect for international law but also by 
powerful countries’ co-opting the UN Security Council for their own 
purposes.265  African leaders such as President Mbeki view the Security 
Council’s response to Libya, particularly UN Resolution 1973, as a perfect 
example of this problem.  UN Resolution 1973 was adopted to protect 
civilians in Libya and effectuate a ceasefire.266  However, according to 
President Mbeki, UN Resolution 1973 was misused by NATO members to 
effectuate regime change in Libya despite the fact that the “Resolution said 
nothing about ‘regime change.’ ”267  The Peace and Security Council 
expressed a similar view at its 275th meeting:  
[The] Council stresses the need for all countries and 
organizations involved in the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 1973 (2011) to act in a manner fully 
consistent with international legality and the resolution’s 
provisions, whose objective is solely to ensure the protection of 
the civilian population.  [The Peace and Security Council 
urged] all involved to refrain from actions, including military 
operations targeting Libyan Senior Officials and socio-
economic [sic] infrastructure, that would further compound the 
situation and make it more difficult to achieve international 
consensus on the best way forward.268 
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Thus, although some African countries may have been unmotivated to act 
by Gaddafi’s financial contributions, it appears that the African Union and 
several African countries failed to support military action in Libya because 
they may have viewed the Security Council and NATO’s use of UN 
Resolution 1973 as an attack on African self-determination. 
On February 24, 2011, the African Union finally publicly criticized the 
actions of the Gaddafi regime.269  The African Union established a high-level, 
ad hoc committee (Libyan Committee) comprised of the African 
Commission chairperson and the presidents of Mali, Uganda, the Republic of 
Congo, Mauritania, and South Africa.270  During the May 25, 2011 
extraordinary session Assembly meeting, the Libyan Committee set forth 
recommendations for the peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis in an “AU 
Roadmap.”271  The Assembly ultimately adopted the AU Roadmap, along 
with the Libyan Committee’s purported recommendations, agreeing to 
endorse the following preliminary steps: 
(i) a further visit to Libya to pursue the dialogue initiated with 
the parties, including [a discussion of] [the urgent] issue of the 
ceasefire, for which the Ad hoc Committee intends [to table] a 
detailed document;  
 
(ii) the dispatching of a ministerial delegation to New York to 
interact with the [Security Council] and its members; and 
 
(iii) practical steps to engage specific AU bilateral partners on 
the Roadmap and [the actions] to be taken by the international 
community to facilitate an early resolution of [the conflict] in 
Libya.272 
The African Union’s establishment of the Libyan Committee stands as a 
quintessential employment of the institutionalist approach in international 
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relations.  Together with allied international actors, the African Union’s 
response team sought to pursue a dialogue with parties to the Libyan crisis, 
obtain implementation of the AU Roadmap, and monitor—and ultimately 
resolve—the crisis in Libya.273  A team such as this Libyan Committee 
arguably constitutes a monitoring mechanism, an idea fervently encouraged 
by the institutionalist perspective.  As previously noted in Part II.A of this 
Article, the institutionalist standpoint supports these monitoring mechanisms, 
as such tactics may serve to urge compliance and cooperation, monitor 
cheating, and systematically maintain order and resolution.  However, 
although the African Union established the Libyan Committee, the 
Committee enjoyed little success once created.  For example, the AU 
Roadmap adopted by the Libyan Committee failed to stop the daily violent 
clashes between the rebels and Gaddafi’s supporters.274  
Additionally, while the Peace and Security Council welcomed Gaddafi’s 
decision to initially accept the AU Roadmap,275 negotiations eventually fell 
through.  In fact, the peace plan that was tentatively approved by Gaddafi did 
not include a provision for Gaddafi’s removal from power.276  In June of 
2011, the Libyan Committee announced that it would attempt to broker 
peace negotiations despite the fact that Gaddafi was not participating.277  
Negotiations eventually broke down again as the Libyan rebels objected to 
any plan that would permit Gaddafi to remain in power.278  The Libyan rebels 
believed that members of the Libyan Committee, such as President Zuma of 
South Africa, were long time allies of Gaddafi and were therefore partial to 
ensuring that Gaddafi remained in power.279  
Moreover, Gaddafi’s financial contributions to the African Union may 
also have led the Libyan rebels to conclude that the African Union’s Libyan 
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Committee supported Gaddafi’s retention of power.  In sum, while the 
institutionalist theory promotes the creation of international committees that 
can serve as monitoring mechanisms to resolve crises and obtain state 
compliance with norms and rules, utilization of tactics consistent with this 
theory may prove to be useless if the resolution team lacks efficacy and 
genuine intentions to achieve resolution.  This may have been the case with 
the Libyan Committee, which appears to have lacked impartiality.  From an 
institutionalist perspective, the African Union clearly failed to obtain 
Gaddafi’s compliance with the human rights and democratic norms 
contained in the African Charter and Constitutive Act.  The Peace and 
Security Council eventually acknowledged that the African Union mediation 
efforts in Libya failed.280 
On June 15, 2011, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda’s Permanent 
Representative to the UN, delivered the African Union’s stance on NATO’s 
military presence in Libya during a meeting between the UN Security 
Council and the Libyan Committee.281  Dr. Rugunda acknowledged that 
further dialogue and action on the part of the African Union should have 
occurred much sooner given that Libya is a founding member of the African 
Union.282  Dr. Rugunda described the Libyan conflict as a civil war, and he 
expressed that the characterization of the violence in Libya as genocide or 
imminent genocide was simply an attempt “to use it as a pretext for the 
undermining of the sovereignty of States.”283  Dr. Rugunda stated that the 
African Union encouraged the promotion of dialogue, the implementation of 
a transitional mechanism, and an overall peaceful resolution of the conflict in 
Libya.284 
In sum, while Dr. Rugunda’s statement of the African Union’s position 
supports effective institutionalist measures, such as monitoring mechanisms 
and the collaboration of institutions to effectuate peaceful resolution, his 
casual characterization of the violence in Libya as a mere civil war not 
graduated to the classification of genocide unveils the blatant inadequacies of 
the African Union and a potential bias in favor of Libya.  In fact, Libya’s 
own representative to the UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi, claimed that Gaddafi had 
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committed genocide against the people of Libya.285  Furthermore, Gaddafi 
appears to have threatened the Libyan people and the opposition with 
genocide in a speech given in February of 2011.286  Additionally, Dr. 
Rugunda accused the international community of an attempt to undermine 
the sovereignty of states.287  This sounds strikingly similar to the statements 
made by several African heads of state who sought to utilize the OAU 
Charter’s noninterference clause to shield themselves from international 
intervention.288  Thus, in order to rectify its inconsistencies and successfully 
protect the human rights of African peoples, the African Union must respond 
to grave violations of larger countries such as Libya just as tenaciously as it 
has responded to violations by smaller countries such as Guinea (as 
discussed in Part IV.B of this Article).  
The African Union’s inability to resolve the crisis in Libya may have 
been exacerbated by the roles of the Arab League and NATO, two 
organizations with competing political agendas.  Dr. Rugunda essentially 
alleged that other countries used the Libyan crisis to perpetuate regime 
change in Libya, and as a result, he claimed that the UN and NATO were not 
impartial in their response to the Libyan crisis.289  On the other hand, leaders 
of the member states of the Arab League have historically avoided any action 
that could be perceived as supporting Western intervention in Arab countries 
and have resorted to using anti-western language to “distract public attention 
from other, far more serious problems [in their countries].”290  In his speech 
to the UN, Dr. Rugunda condemned NATO and the international community 
for “[i]gnoring the AU for three months” and instead proceeding with 
reckless bombings, actions that he classified as “arrogant and provocative.”291  
It may be that neither NATO nor the Arab League has taken the African 
Union seriously, either in its role in resolving African crises generally or in 
its suggestions for peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis. Thus, the African 
Union’s credibility and effectiveness on the international stage was called 
into question and likely contributed to the African Union’s inability to 
effectively resolve the Libyan crisis.  For example, the Libyan rebels already 
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believed that the African Union was biased in favor of Gaddafi,292 and 
because the Security Council and NATO ignored the African Union’s 
recommendations for resolution, the Libyan rebels and Gaddafi were likely 
more inclined to ignore the African Union’s attempts to address the crisis. 
According to realists, the extent to which a state’s behavior conforms to 
international law depends on a state’s political, economic, and military 
power in comparison to its surrounding states293 and human rights regime.294  
Consistent with the realist approach, the African Union attempted to exert 
political power over Libya by joining other international players, such as the 
EU, the United States, Russia, and the Arab League, in publicly 
communicating vehement opposition to the Gaddafi regime’s vicious attacks 
on civilians.295  The Assembly endorsed the UN Security Council’s adoption 
of Resolution 1970,296 a proposition imposing an arms embargo on Libya as 
well as financial and travel sanctions on Gaddafi and certain members of his 
government.297  Specifically, the United States, the EU, Japan, South Korea, 
and other countries imposed additional sanctions on Gaddafi and restricted 
financial transactions and arms shipments to Libya.298  The EU expanded 
existing sanctions “to include a visa ban and asset freezes on [particular] 
individuals.”299  
In contrast, the African Union failed to impose direct financial sanctions 
on Gaddafi or Libya.300  Simply put, the African Union’s response appears 
feeble in comparison to the ardent efforts of other international actors.  From 
a realist perspective, states are more likely to comply with international law 
when the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance.301  
However, while the measures contained in Resolution 1970 are coherent with 
the realist perspective, these measures were merely endorsed by the African 
Union and were not actually initiated or implemented.302  From a realist 
perspective, the African Union needs to individually impose sanctions on its 
member states in order to increase the likelihood of member state compliance 
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with the African Charter and Constitutive Act.  By inflicting targeted 
financial and travel sanctions on Gaddafi and his supporters the African 
Union could have alleviated the concerns of both the international 
community and the Libyan rebels regarding the African Union’s alleged lack 
of impartiality, which were due to the financial contributions it received from 
Gaddafi.  This might have led the Libyan rebels to support, rather than 
oppose, the African Union’s attempts to resolve the crisis. 
When the Libyan rebels eventually seized power from Gaddafi and 
established the National Transitional Council (NTC), the African Union 
initially refused to recognize the NTC as the legitimate government of 
Libya.303  The African Union’s initial refusal to recognize the NTC may have 
been due in part to Article 30 of the Constitutive Act.  Article 30 suspends 
governments that come to power through unconstitutional means from 
participation in the African Union.304  Of course the irony here is that 
Gaddafi, like many other African leaders of that era, unconstitutionally came 
to power by overthrowing the Libyan royal family in 1969.305  In September 
of 2011, the African Union finally recognized the NTC as the de facto 
government in Libya.306  This was one month after the United States and a 
number of other European countries had recognized the NTC.307  The 
African Union’s failure to timely recognize the NTC is indicative of its lack 
of efficacy in resolving the Libyan crisis.  On January 30, 2012, the 
Assembly directed the African Union Commission to take all steps necessary 
to establish an AU Liaison Office in Libya to monitor the situation in 
Libya.308 
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In sum, the African Union should have timely exercised its authority to 
counteract the human rights violations committed by Gaddafi.  Article 4(h) 
of the Constitutive Act allows the African Union to intervene in the affairs of 
a member state in grave circumstances such as crimes against humanity and 
genocide.309  The African Union could have utilized Article 4(h) to exert its 
authority during the Libyan crisis by deploying a peacekeeping force to 
Libya.  Additionally, the African Union should have imposed financial and 
travel sanctions on Gaddafi and other individuals in his entourage in 
accordance with the Constitutive Act, which permits the African Union to 
impose sanctions when a member state fails to comply with the decisions and 
policies of the African Union.310  The African Union’s feeble response to the 
Libyan crisis was heavily criticized by the international community.  For 
example, a February 25, 2011 report revealed that several civil society 
organizations organized a press briefing regarding Africa’s part in the Libyan 
revolts; the briefings were held in Rosebank, Johannesburg by a panel 
consisting of Civicus, Amnesty International, Global Call to Action against 
Poverty, and African Democracy Forum.311  Ingrid Srinath, secretary general 
of Civicus, asserted that “Libya is part of the AU. . . .  There’s a need to send 
a message across Africa about what the AU stands for.  If the AU is going to 
be the last to respond, what does [that lack of response] say about [the AU’s] 
legitimacy?”312  According to the report “for Noel Kututwa, who deals with 
foreign policy at Amnesty International, the international community has 
failed the Libyan people in their hour of greatest need. . . . he said the 
African Union should start showing concrete action towards African 
conflicts.”313  Moreover, Rajesh Latchman of Global Call to Action against 
Poverty believes that democracy and human rights in Africa have been 
threatened by the African Union’s failure to take appropriate action in 
Libya.314  Unfortunately, the African Union’s performance during the Libyan 
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crisis demonstrated an unwillingness to exert strong disciplinary measures 
against large countries that are led by its wealthy benefactors, such as 
Gaddafi.  Furthermore, from a realist perspective the organization lacks the 
requisite characteristics of timeliness and efficacy to minimize conflict in 
such countries or obtain compliance with the African Charter or Constitutive 
Act. 
The following section examines the political turmoil in Kenya and the 
African Union’s efforts to resolve the crisis.  Similar to the organization’s 
response to the human rights violations in Libya, the African Union’s actions 
were feeble in comparison to the resources and attention other international 
organizations committed.  
C.  Kenya 
In the December 2007 presidential elections, polls predicted that the 
Orange Democratic Movement political party would win the election and 
Raila Odinga would become the next president of Kenya.315  The Electoral 
Commission of Kenya eventually declared that President Kibaki had been re-
elected, but the election process was controversial. International and 
domestic observers described the election as “rigged and deeply flawed.”316  
Even the chairman of the Electoral Commission,  Samuel Kivuitu, “admitted 
the irregularities and claimed he was pressured into announcing the 
results.”317  Such coercion violates the democratic principles contained in the 
African Charter and Constitutive Act.  
Brutal violence erupted in Kenya immediately after the election results 
were announced.  Observers described supporters of the opposition engaging 
in “spontaneous demonstrations of anger” and violently attacking pro-
government districts and properties.318  Such violence resulted in the deaths 
of more than 1,000 individuals and the displacement of around 350,000, 
including 80,000 children under the age of five319 in violation of the respect 
for life and dignity principles contained in Articles 4 and 5 of the African 
Charter, respectively.320  Some protestors were reported to have been “shot 
and killed by police, while many others died [as a result] of mob violence.”321  
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Other reports allege that, Kenyan security forces targeted opposition 
supporters, provided assistance to pro-government gangs, and failed to 
protect the civilian population322 in violation of Article 6 of the African 
Charter, which provides that “[e]very individual [has] the right to liberty for 
and the security of his person,” and “no one may be arbitrarily arrested or 
detained.”323  The Kenyan police have been blamed for much of the brutality 
that occurred during the post-election violence.324  In 2008, the Peace and 
Security Council estimated that as a result of the election violence in Kenya 
approximately 235,000 people were in Internationally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) camps, 270,000 were believed to be outside of these camps, and 
12,000 people were refugees in Uganda.325 
Soon after the post-election violence erupted, the Peace and Security 
Council condemned the violence in Kenya,326 and former chairperson of the 
African Union, President Kufuor of Ghana, traveled to Kenya in an attempt 
to resolve the conflict.327  However, President Kufuor’s attempts to initiate 
peace negotiations between the rivaling political factions were not welcomed 
by the Kenyan government.328  After President Kufuor’s failed attempt to 
initiate negotiations between the parties, the UN became involved.  On 
January 22, 2008, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan traveled to 
Nairobi with a mediation team to begin negotiation efforts between President 
Kibaki and Odinga.329  On February 28, 2008, after a month of negotiations, 
Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement that created the prime 
minister position, to be held by Odinga, as well as a multi-party cabinet.330  
Although the power-sharing agreement brought an end to the post-election 
violence, some argue that the agreement was rushed and did not allow 
President Kibaki and Odinga to develop a working partnership.331  
Additionally, the power-sharing agreement did not address the underlying 
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ethnic and political tensions that ignited the violence in the first place.332  
Nevertheless, Jakaya Kikwete, former Chairperson of the African Union has 
maintained that the African Union “succeeded in bringing the two warring 
parties to the negotiating table, efforts that culminated in the establishment of 
the Government of National Unity.”333 
Institutionalists posit that the rules and norms created by a human rights 
regime can engender member state compliance.334  From an institutionalist 
perspective the African Union failed in its attempt to ensure that Kenya 
complied with the democratic and human rights principles contained in 
Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the African Charter and Article 4(m) of the 
Constitutive Act.335  Based on those principles, the African Union’s efforts to 
end the violence and crisis in Kenya via brokering a peace deal between 
President Kibaki and Odinga that would bring Kenya back into compliance 
with the norms set forth in the African Charter and Constitutive Act was a 
complete failure.336  It was not until Kofi Annan and the UN got involved that 
a power-sharing agreement was signed.337  From an institutionalist 
perspective, merely attempting to initiate negotiations was not enough to 
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ensure compliance and cooperation by the rivaling political factions in 
Kenya.  Additionally, despite the fact that the power-sharing agreement 
immediately ended the crisis, the power-sharing agreement has only been 
marginally successful at eliminating human rights violations in Kenya.  For 
example, in March 2009 unknown gunmen assassinated two human rights 
advocates, Kamau King’ara and John Paul Oulu.338  Several of the key 
reforms agreed to in the power-sharing agreement have yet to be 
implemented by the Kenyan government.339  Prime Minister Odinga 
acknowledged this shortcoming in June of 2008 at a meeting with members 
of the Bush Administration and of Congress.340  Additionally, although the 
power-sharing agreement resolved the immediate political dispute in Kenya 
“it also institutionalized systemic political deadlock and set the stage for 
other African experiments in power sharing, notably in Zimbabwe.”341  
Today, the Kenyan government continues to struggle with promoting good 
governance, and as national elections “draw near in [Kenya,] a country [that 
remains] sharply divided along tribal lines, observers say lawmakers are 
prioritizing political expedience at the expense of constitutional 
implementation.”342  As recently as June 2012, the Kenyan parliament 
attempted to pass legislation that would safeguard their incumbency during 
upcoming elections.343 
While the African Union did attempt to assist in the mediation efforts in 
Kenya, it has not made any attempt to encourage the prosecution of those 
Kenyan officials that were responsible for the post-election violence.  The 
African Union has actually supported Kenya’s resistance to prosecuting these 
individuals.  In December of 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo claimed that six senior Kenyan 
officials were responsible for the violence that followed the 2007 election.344  
Initially the Kenyan Government agreed to cooperate with the ICC.345 
However, Kenya reversed its position and received support from the African 
Union to defer the ICC prosecution.346  The African Union’s reluctance to 
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support the Kenyan ICC prosecutions is indicative of the African Union’s 
wider negative stance on the ICC.347  The African Union has historically been 
concerned with what the African Union sees as a discriminatory double 
standard in ICC prosecutions.  The African Union, along with many of its 
member states, believes that the ICC is quite willing to prosecute individuals 
for human rights violations in Africa but fails to prosecute Westerners for 
human rights abuses, such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.348  
The African Union’s concern regarding the ICC may be valid given the 
fact that almost all of the ICC’s indictments and prosecutions have involved 
African individuals and African conflicts.349  However, it is true that Africa 
continues to be plagued with vast human rights abuses.  As such, perhaps the 
ICC’s record of prosecuting African individuals simply reflects the large 
number of human rights abuses that occur in Africa.  In either case, the 
perception that the ICC is willing to prosecute Africans but not Westerners 
must be resolved jointly by the African Union and the ICC.  Despite the 
African Union’s stance on the ICC, it appears that Kenya is beginning to 
cooperate with the ICC to some extent.  President Kibaki has recently 
promised to resolve the problems born by displaced victims of the political 
crisis.350  Further, on January 23, 2012, the ICC ruled that four prominent 
Kenyans must stand trial for crimes against humanity committed during the 
political crisis in 2007–2008.351  Kenyan judges took the time to explain the 
ICC ruling at a public session.352  
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Analyzing the African Union’s response from a realist perspective 
indicates that the African Union’s response to the postelection crisis in 
Kenya was enormously ineffective at eliminating the human rights violations 
as well as ensuring Kenya’s compliance with the human rights and 
democratic principles contained in the African Charter and Constitutive Act.  
The realist perspective suggests that states will choose to abide by their 
international obligations only when it is in their self-interest to do so.353  
Therefore, states perform a cost-benefit analysis in determining whether to 
comply with their human rights obligations, and the African Union should 
effectively communicate that the costs of non-compliance outweigh the 
benefits.  Unfortunately, the African Union did not initiate or implement any 
measures that would communicate to Kenya that the cost of noncompliance 
outweighed the benefits.  
The African Union did not sanction Kenya with financial penalties.354  
Furthermore, the African Union’s attempt to initiate negotiations was feeble 
and ineffective.  The African Union’s support of the delay in the ICC 
prosecutions is also inconsistent with a realist approach to international 
relations.  As discussed in Part II.B of this Article, realists posit that states 
are more likely to comply with international law when the cost of 
noncompliance outweighs the benefits of compliance.  By failing to support 
the ICC prosecutions, the African Union has communicated to Kenya that it 
is in the country’s best interest not to comply with its obligations under 
Articles 1 and 26 of the African Charter, which provide that member states 
must promote, protect, and recognize the human rights and democratic 
principles contained in the African Charter.355  Despite the African Union’s 
failure to resolve the Kenyan crisis on its own accord, it is important to 
acknowledge that the Kenyan crisis presented a unique set of circumstances 
that possibly go beyond the African Union’s ability to both eliminate human 
rights violations and ensure compliance with the principles contained in the 
African Charter and the Constitutive Act.  The Kenyan crisis involved the 
creation of a post-electoral, power-sharing agreement as well as a new 
constitution.  As such, perhaps the ultimate solution to the Kenyan crisis had 
to involve the participation of mediators and mechanisms outside of the 
African Union itself (even if the African Union remained nominally part of 
the process).  
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The following section sets forth the problems faced by the African Union 
in light of its response to the crises in Zimbabwe, Libya, and Kenya.  The 
section further proposes additional concrete legal solutions to improve the 
ability of the African Union to obtain member state compliance with the 
African Charter and Constitutive Act. 
VI.  ADDITIONAL SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE STATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
AFRICAN CHARTER AND CONSTITUTIVE ACT 
From an institutionalist perspective, several norms established by the 
African Charter and other governing instruments have stood as barriers to the 
African Union’s success.  Such limitations include claw-back clauses and the 
principle of equitable regional representation and rotation.  Moreover, from a 
realist perspective, issues such as the limited political will of the African 
Union and its member states, as well as the African Union’s failure to timely 
and uniformly impose sanctions, have beset the organization since inception.  
From an institutionalist and realist perspective, the potential solutions that 
the African Union could implement to ensure member state compliance with 
the African Charter and Constitutive Act, include revising the latter to 
address budgetary issues, standards for the election of a chairman, the 
frequency of Assembly meetings, and the timeliness of Assembly decision 
making.  Further, the organization could revise the African Charter to include 
the right to vote, remove the claw-back clauses, and address certain concerns 
regarding state reporting procedures.  All of the above were discussed in 
detail in Parts III.A and III.B of this Article.  The following sections discuss 
several additional solutions: (a) timely and uniformly imposing sanctions and 
amending the Council Protocol to remove the principle of equitable regional 
representation and rotation; (b) better utilization of the African Union 
Commission on International Law; (c) more frequent utilization of the 
provisional measures permitted by the African Commission’s rules of 
procedure; and (d) providing individual and NGO access to the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights. 
A.  Limited Political Will, Council Protocol, and Timely Sanctions 
The African Union’s responses to the crises in Kenya, Libya, and 
Zimbabwe indicate that the African Union has limited political will.  The 
African Union and its member states tend to only effectively intervene in 
political crises involving countries with smaller populations and less political 
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power, such as Madagascar and Guinea.356  In contrast, the African Union 
and its member states have responded reluctantly, and with very little 
success, to political turmoil occurring in larger, more powerful states such as 
Libya and Kenya.357  Moreover, many of the current leaders of African states 
have risen to power through undemocratic means and have been flagrant 
human rights violators.  In fact, as of 2008, only eighteen African countries 
regularly elected their governments in free and open elections.358  As a result, 
some member states have been reluctant to criticize other state leaders when 
they violate the human rights and democratic principles set forth in the 
African Charter and the Constitutive Act.359  The composition of the Peace 
and Security Council evidences this problem. 
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co.uk/news/38261/mugabe-has-ranted-against-western-countries-over-gaddafi-.html.  Similarly, 
Mbasogo has expressed his support for Mugabe’s land seizure measures in Zimbabwe.  
Macdonald Dzirutwe, E Guinea Leader Praises Mugabe Land Seizures, MAIL&GUARDIAN 
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www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2012/02/09/the-five-worst-leaders-in-africa/. 
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In 2010 the leaders of Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, and Libya were 
each elected to serve three years on the Peace and Security Council.360  The 
Peace and Security Council is responsible for resolving political conflicts 
and crises in member states.361  Additionally, pursuant to Article 7(g) of the 
Council Protocol, the Peace and Security Council has the power to “institute 
sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in 
a member state.”362  The current and former leaders of Equatorial Guinea 
(Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo), Zimbabwe (Mugabe), and Libya 
(Gaddafi) each have a long record of noncompliance with the democratic and 
human rights principles contained in the African Charter and Constitutive 
Act.  For example, President Mbasogo has controlled Equatorial Guinea 
since 1979, and after Gaddafi’s death President Mbasogo is now referred to 
as “Africa’s longest-serving ruler.”363  President Mbasogo has continued to 
violate the freedom of expression and freedom of association principles 
contained in the African Charter364 and has held sham referendums to keep 
himself in power.365  Furthermore, evidence suggests that the citizens of 
Equatorial Guinea are routinely arrested and detained without due process of 
the law in violation of Article 6 of the African Charter.366  Despite the fact 
that President Mbasogo has failed to hold free and fair democratic elections 
and has continued to violate a number of the human rights and democratic 
principles set forth in the African Charter and Constitutive Act, President 
Mbasogo was elected to serve as the chairman and leader of the African 
Union in January of 2011.367  This clearly undermines the African Union’s 
commitment to democracy and the protection of human rights.   
Similarly, as previously noted in Part V.A of this Article, President 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe has controlled his country for almost thirty-two years, 
though his many human rights abuses have been well documented.  Thus, it 
came as no surprise when President Mugabe supported Gaddafi, another 
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2012]      THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 
 
flagrant human rights abuser, and condemned other African countries for 
supporting NATO’s bombing of Libya.368  Furthermore, it appears that there 
is no end in sight to President Mugabe’s reign in Zimbabwe since in January 
of 2012, President Mugabe appeared before the African Union to request 
support for his 2012 re-election campaign.369  The African Union is not the 
only organization that has erred on occasion by providing support to 
Mugabe.  The UN recently appointed Mugabe as a tourism envoy.370  
President Mbasogo, President Mugabe, and so many other African leaders 
appear to be unwilling to hold recalcitrant leaders accountable for their 
noncompliance with the human rights and democratic principles contained in 
the African Charter and Constitutive Act, because they fear that they too will 
be held accountable for their noncompliance.  The failure of African leaders 
to hold their counterparts accountable evidences the limited political will of 
African leaders. 
One potential solution to the problem of limited political will is to amend 
the Council Protocol.  Article 5, Section 2(g) of the Council Protocol 
provides that the members of the Peace and Security Council are to be 
elected with regard to a number of principles including respect for 
constitutional governance, the rule of law, and human rights.371  In theory 
then, states, such as Zimbabwe, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea, that continue 
to violate the human rights and democratic principles set forth in the African 
Charter and Constitutive Act should not be permitted to serve on the Peace 
and Security Council.  However, Article 5, Section 2 of the Council Protocol 
also provides that in electing the members of the Peace and Security Council 
the Assembly must apply the principle of equitable regional representation 
and rotation.372  While this principle is not specifically defined in the Council 
Protocol, it arguably requires that each African region be equally represented 
on the Peace and Security Council for a certain number of years.  At first 
glance, the use of the principal of equitable regional representation appears 
to be appropriate given the diversity and vastness of the African continent.  
However, this principle may have contributed to the election of member 
states, such as Zimbabwe and Libya, to the Peace and Security Council since 
such states may regionally represent an area of Africa, though these states 
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138  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:75 
 
have clearly failed to respect the human rights and democratic principles 
contained in the African Charter.  In practice the principle of equitable 
regional representation and rotation contained in Article 5, Section 2 of the 
Council Protocol may trump the respect for human rights principles 
contained in Article 5, Section 2(g).  Therefore, it may be responsible for the 
appointment of member states that have failed to respect human rights to the 
Peace and Security Council that have failed to respect human rights.  As 
such, the Council Protocol should be amended to (1) remove references to 
the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation from Article 5, 
Section 2; and (2) clearly provide that a member state’s ability to serve on 
the Peace and Security Council is conditioned upon acceptance by person the 
chair of the Assembly upon review of the state’s record of compliance with 
the human rights and democratic principles set forth in both the African 
Charter and Constitutive Act.  
Institutionalists posit that a human rights regime can encourage state 
compliance with the norms established by the human rights regime by 
rewarding states that comply with these norms and rules.373  Instead of 
relying on the principle of equitable regional representation, the African 
Union should reward states who comply with the norms and principles 
established in the African Charter and Constitutive Act with leadership 
positions on the Peace and Security Council.  The Peace and Security 
Council is an integral part of the African Union as well as the main organ 
responsible for resolving political and humanitarian crises, and promoting 
peace, security, and democracy in Africa.374  Moreover, Article 7 of the 
Council Protocol provides that the Peace and Security Council has the power 
to “institute sanctions [when] an unconstitutional change of Government” 
occurs as defined in the Lome Declaration.375  Given the Peace and Security 
Council’s important role in the African Union and its power to issue 
sanctions, the Council should consist of unbiased member states that have a 
strong record of protecting human rights and encouraging democracy.  The 
need for impartial and unbiased states to serve on the Peace and Security 
Council is aptly evidenced by the problems the African Union faced in its 
attempts to resolve the Libyan crisis.  Libyan rebels refused to support the 
African Union’s negotiation efforts as the African Union was seen as biased 
in favor of Gaddafi, who represented Libya as a member of the Peace and 
Security Council at the time of the uprising.376 
                                                                                                                                                       
 373 Powell, supra note 5, at 426–27. 
 374 Council Protocol, supra note 65, art. 2. 
 375 Id. art. 7. 
 376 See 2010 PSC Election, supra note 360 (three year term began 2012). 
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In a sign that the African Union might be ready to seriously promote 
democracy, on January 29, 2012, the African Union selected President Yayi 
Boni of Benin, an electoral democracy,377 to serve as the chairman of the 
African Union.378  While President Yayi has been accused of corruption, 
evidence suggests that his government has a decent track record of respecting 
many of the human rights principles contained in the African Charter 
including, but not limited to, freedom of expression.379  By replacing 
President Mbasogo—who has a track record of human rights abuses—with 
President Yayi, the African Union may be signaling that it is finally ready to 
lead by example and be taken seriously.  The African Union needs to ensure 
that its leaders, particularly the chairman of the Assembly, and the member 
states of its central organs respect and promote human rights as well as 
democratic principles in their respective countries so that these leaders and 
member states can serve as stellar examples for other African countries to 
follow.  Furthermore, countries such as South Africa and Benin that have a 
history of holding free and fair democratic elections should openly support 
and encourage democracies in countries such as Equatorial Guinea, where 
President Mbasogo has ruled for the last thirty-three years.380  
Another solution the African Union could implement to encourage state 
compliance with the African Charter and Constitutive Act would be to timely 
and uniformly impose sanctions against member states for human rights 
violations.  The limited political will of the African Union appears to be a 
contributing factor for the African Union’s failure to impose sanctions in a 
timely or uniformed manner.  For example, there was a one-year delay in 
imposing sanctions against Madagascar381 and an eleven-month delay in 
imposing sanctions against Guinea.382  Additionally, as discussed in Part V of 
this Article, the African Union failed to impose any sanctions against 
Zimbabwe, Libya, or Kenya.  The EU first placed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 
2002383 and has recently renewed those sanctions384 despite the African 
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Union’s failure to issue sanctions against Zimbabwe.  The political crises in 
Madagascar and Zimbabwe both include a failure of each government to 
respect the democratic principles set forth in the Constitutive Act and the 
African Charter; however, the African Union has elected to sanction 
Madagascar but not Zimbabwe.385  In fact, the African Union has requested 
that the international community lift all sanctions against Zimbabwe.386  
Similarly, in Guinea the African Union issued sanctions against Camara after 
he refused to provide assurances that he would not run for re-election in the 
scheduled presidential elections.387  However, the African Union allowed 
Mugabe to retain his position as president and participate in future elections 
despite his thirty-year reign in Zimbabwe.388  Rather than playing favorites 
with countries such as Zimbabwe, the African Union needs to utilize a more 
uniform approach when issuing sanctions.  Furthermore, from a realist 
perspective, imposing sanctions in a timely and consistent manner 
encourages swifter compliance with international obligations, as they may 
lead a state to conclude that noncompliance is not in the state’s financial 
interest.  Therefore, when the African Union fails to impose timely sanctions 
in a uniform manner, it communicates to member states that the benefits of 
noncompliance outweigh the costs of compliance and that there are no real 
costs for failing to comply with the African Charter or the Constitutive Act.  
Although there has been rigorous academic debate regarding the efficacy 
of sanctions, recent discussions on this topic suggest that sanctions can be 
effective at ensuring state compliance under certain conditions.  For 
example, sanctions may elicit state or leader compliance when the state or 
leader has miscalculated the likelihood that sanctions will be imposed, 
“underestimate[d] the impact of sanctions, or wrongly believe[d] that 
sanctions will be imposed and maintained even if it yields.”389  Additionally, 
sanctions that are imposed directly against a government or leader may cause 
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the government or leader to lose power.390  For instance, some argue the 
economic sanctions that the United States imposed against Nicaragua’s 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (Sandinista) in the 1980s led to the 
defeat of the Sandinista candidate, Daniel Ortega, in the 1990 Nicaraguan 
elections.391  Thus, a leader or government may be more likely to 
compromise when sanctions threaten his or her position in office.392  
Sanctions can also be effective when the target state or leader faces 
significant domestic, political opposition.393  For example, the apartheid 
regime in South Africa faced significant domestic opposition from the 
African National Congress, and sanctions played an important role in the 
elimination of this regime.394  In the African context, timely and uniformly 
imposing sanctions may be an effective tool that enables the African Union 
to ensure recalcitrant states comply with the human rights and democratic 
provisions of the African Charter and Constitutive Act.  
The conditions that may lead to the effective utilization of sanctions exist 
in a number of African states.  For example, in Madagascar, Rajoelina faced 
domestic opposition from a faction of the military that demanded Rajoelina’s 
resignation after he assumed power, and in May 2010 he faced a mutiny by 
gendarmerie.395  Similarly, Mugabe faced domestic opposition from the MDC 
in Zimbabwe,396 and in Guinea, Camara miscalculated the determination of 
the African Union to impose sanctions when he insisted on participating in 
future presidential elections over the African Union’s objections.397   
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Sanctions against recalcitrant African leaders and states “should be 
graded according to the nature of the violation and the reason the state [or 
leader] proffers for failing to comply.”398  Moreover, despite the debate 
regarding the efficacy of sanctions, the prevalence of human rights abuses 
and the lack of democracy in Africa suggest that the African Union has no 
choice but to utilize all potential tools in its arsenal, including graded 
sanctions, to ensure state compliance with the human rights and democratic 
principles contained in the African Charter and Constitutive Act.  
B.  African Union Commission on International Law 
The African Union established the African Union Commission on 
International Law (AUCIL) at the Twelfth Ordinary Session of the Assembly 
held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February of 2009.399  Article 4 of the 
Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL 
Statute) sets forth the primary objectives of the AUCIL, including “to 
undertake activities relating to codification and progressive development of 
international law in the African continent.”400  There are striking similarities 
between the AUCIL Statute and the Statute of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) adopted in 1947 (ILC Statute).401  For example, Article 3, 
Section 2 of the AUCIL Statute is exactly the same as Article 2, Section 2 of 
the ILC Statute.402  Similarly, and most importantly, the main goal of the ILC 
and AUCIL appears to be the same; Article 4(a) of the AUCIL contains 
similar language as that found in Article 1 of the ILC Statute, which provides 
that “[t]he International Law Commission shall have for its object the 
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”403  Thus, the African Union seemingly has modeled the AUCIL 
after the widely successful ILC.  
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Since its inception in 1947, the ILC has worked extensively in the field of 
international law, meeting annually to review issues such as nationality and 
statelessness and treaty law.404  The most important function of the ILC is the 
drafting of articles and other documents on various aspects of international 
law either upon request of the UN General Assembly, other U.N. organs, the 
member states, or its own initiative.405  Upon completion of its work on a 
topic, the ILC refers the final draft back to the UN General Assembly for it 
to take action as deemed appropriate, normally including its 
recommendations as to what measures should be adopted.406  The ILC is 
responsible for authoring a number of documents central to international law. 
Since its formulation of the Nuremberg principles at its first session in 1949, 
the ILC has worked extensively in international criminal law.407  Among its 
most prominent roles in that area was drafting the Statute for the 
International Criminal Court in 1994.408  Other successes the ILC has enjoyed 
include drafting the following documents: the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States, the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,409 and the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.410  As a result of 
these successes, many have argued that there are, today, few domains of 
international law to the development of which the ILC has not contributed in 
some way.411  
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The African Union should be lauded for creating an organ that is modeled 
after the very successful ILC.  However, three years have passed since the 
creation of the AUCIL, and very little action has been taken by the AUCIL 
during that time period.  The AUCIL website indicates that it has held only 
three ordinary sessions, the most recent of which took place on March 21, 
2011.412  In contrast, three years after the ILC was created it drafted the 
Nuremberg Principles in 1950.413  The AUCIL amended its Rules of 
Procedure during its Second Ordinary Session414 and, after its Third Ordinary 
Session, developed the Report on the Inter-Sessional Activities of the 
AUCIL Bureau, setting forth AUCIL activities between December 2011 and 
March 2011.415  Though norm development is also the AUCIL’s main focus, 
modeling its statute after the ILC Statute is only the first step in ensuring the 
success of the AUCIL.  The AUCIL has the potential to play a larger role in 
achieving the African Union’s goal—ensuring state compliance with human 
rights and democratic principles—but fails to do so because it is currently 
underutilized. 
From an institutionalist perspective, a regional human rights system can 
obtain state compliance by clearly establishing unambiguous rules and norms 
for states to follow.416  Thus, in order to replicate the ILC’s success, the 
AUCIL must become more active in promoting and establishing clear norms 
and rules for the African Union.  Moreover, the AUCIL should be 
instrumental in creating new methods, via drafting new instruments, to better 
ensure member state compliance with the principles set forth in the African 
Charter and Constitutive Act.  
The AUCIL should also play an instrumental role in providing guidance 
to the African Union on interpreting and implementing those norms already 
contained in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
(Democratic Charter).417  The Democratic Charter was adopted on January 
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30, 2007,418 and it requires, among other things, that member states commit 
themselves to the promotion of democracy and human rights.419  Article 48 of 
the Democratic Charter provides that the charter will become effective only 
after fifteen member states have ratified the charter.420  The Democratic 
Charter entered into force on February 15, 2012.421  To date, the following 
fifteen member states have ratified the Democratic Charter: Mauritania, 
Rwanda, Guinea, Ethiopia, Chad, Niger, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Burkina Faso, South Africa, Nigeria, Lesotho, Zambia, and 
Cameroon.422  The newly effective Democratic Charter has been referred to 
as “one of the most progressive legal instruments” that has been adopted by 
the African Union .423  Other African states have been unwilling to express 
support for the Democratic Charter, arguably because of the Charter’s 
expansive provisions on the promotion of democracy,424 but also because 
these states have not placed a high priority on ratification.425  For example, 
Article 23, Section 5 of the Democratic Charter provides that an 
unconstitutional change of government includes “any amendment . . . to the 
constitution or legal instruments” of a member state, which “infringe[s] on 
the principles of democratic change of government.”426  Many African heads 
of state have amended the constitutions of their respective countries to keep 
themselves in power.427  Thus, given the Democratic Charter’s expansive 
provisions regarding democratic and human rights, this charter has the 
potential to further promote democracy and decrease unconstitutional 
changes of government in African states.  The AUCIL Statute provides that 
the AUCIL is responsible for the codification of international law and should 
prepare studies on international law in areas that have not been substantially 
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developed by member states of the African Union.428  The Democratic 
Charter has only recently entered into force.  As such, the AUCIL should 
utilize its topic selection power to push the Democratic Charter to the 
forefront of the African Union’s agenda and obtain ratification and 
codification of the Democratic Charter by all member states.  The AUCIL 
should provide guidance to the African Union on how to interpret and apply 
the norms contained the Democratic Charter.  Moreover, pursuant to Article 
8 of the AUCIL Statute, the AUCIL has the power to propose revisions to 
legal instruments adopted by the African Union.429  The AUCIL should 
actively utilize this power to propose revisions to the legal instruments of the 
African Union so as to better aid the African Union in protecting human 
rights and promoting democracy on the African continent. 
C.  Provisional Measures 
The African Union can also encourage state compliance with the African 
Charter and Constitutive Act by more frequently and effectively utilizing 
provisional measures.  The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission 
permits the African Commission, prior to rendering a final decision on a 
communication, to recommend provisional measures that should be taken by 
a member state to avoid irreparable harm to individuals (Original Provisional 
Measures Rule).430  The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission were 
amended in 2010 and the provisional measures rule that was previously 
located in Rule 111 has now been codified in Rule 98 of the revised Rules of 
Procedure (Revised Provisional Measures Rule).431  In contrast to the 
language contained in the Original Provisional Measures Rule, that of the 
Revised Provisional Measures Rule not only grants the African Commission 
power to recommend provisional measures independently, but also grants the 
parties to a petition rights to request that the African Commission issue 
provisional measures.432  The Revised Provisional Measures Rule also 
explicitly requires the African Commission to send a copy of the request for 
provisional measures to the Assembly of the African Union and the Peace 
and Security Council, and establishes a fifteen-day period within which the 
offending state must report back to the African Commission on the 
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implementation of the requested provisional measures.433  Additionally, the 
provisional measures rule gives the chairperson of the African Commission 
the power to take provisional measures when the African Commission is not 
in session.434 
One example of the application of the provisional measures rule and its 
effectiveness in avoiding human rights violations—by ensuring state 
compliance with the human rights guaranteed by the African Charter—is the 
case of Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria.435  In this case, an NGO 
submitted a petition to the African Commission on behalf of Zamani 
Lekwot—a former army general in Nigeria—and a number of other 
individuals sentenced to death by a special tribunal in Nigeria.436  The 
petition alleged that counsel for the defendants was routinely harassed during 
the trial and eventually forced to withdraw as a result.437  The holdings and 
decisions of these special tribunals, which were composed of armed forces, 
police, and judges, were not subject to appeal under Nigerian law.438  The 
petition submitted on behalf of the defendants alleged several violations of 
the African Charter: first, that the lack of judicial appeals for judgments 
rendered by the special tribunal violated Article 7, Section 1(a)’s right to 
appeal decisions before a competent national organ; second, that the 
harassment and deprivation of defense counsel violated Article 7, Section 
1(c)’s right to defense counsel of one’s choice; and finally, that the 
composition of the special tribunals violated an individual’s Article 7, 
Section 1(d) right to be tried by an impartial tribunal.439  The African 
Commission utilized its provisional measures power by requesting that the 
Nigerian government stay execution until the African Commission 
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completed its review of the defendants’ petition.440  The Lagos High Court 
eventually issued an injunction that stayed the execution of the defendants.441   
Upon its final review of the petition, the African Commission held that 
Nigeria had violated Article 7 of the African Charter and reasoned, among 
other things, that the special tribunal’s composition—primarily of persons 
from the executive branch of government, who passed the Civil Disturbances 
Act that created the tribunals—lacked the sufficient appearance of 
impartiality at the very least.442  According to the African Commission, the 
Civil Disturbances Act rendered the decisions of the special tribunals non-
appealable, and  
while punishments decreed as the culmination of a carefully 
conducted criminal procedure do not necessarily constitute 
violations of [the right to life and liberty], to foreclose any 
avenue of appeal to “competent national organs” in criminal 
cases bearing such penalties clearly violates Article 7.1(a) of 
the African Charter, and increases the risk that even severe 
violations may go unredressed.443 
Despite Nigeria’s domestic laws, the death sentences were eventually 
reduced to five years imprisonment.444   
The Constitutional Rights Project clearly illustrates that the provisional 
measures rule can be successfully used to protect human rights in Africa, 
mainly the respect for life principle referenced in Article 4 of the African 
Charter.  Provisional measures may be especially useful when the life or 
physical well-being of an individual is at risk.  However, the provisional 
measures rule is greatly underutilized by the African Commission, which has 
been reluctant to apply these measures to prevent individual human rights 
violations.445  The ability to intervene and enact protective provisions before 
rendering a final decision can protect African citizens from grave physical 
harm and even death, which under certain circumstances may violate the 
rights to life and liberty guaranteed by Articles 4 and 6 of the African 
Charter as seen in the Nigeria Case.446  The need for more frequent utilization 
of the provisional measures rule is evident.  For example, in February of 
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2011, Mugabe’s government arrested, detained, and tortured individuals who 
were watching videos of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, and charged 
these individuals with plotting to overthrow Mugabe’s government.447  The 
actions of Mugabe’s government were clearly in violation of a number of 
human rights principles guaranteed by the African Charter including, but not 
limited to, the Article 5 right to be free from torture and inhumane 
punishment.448  Moreover, at the time of this writing, a number of the 
individuals accused of plotting to overthrow Mugabe in an Egyptian or 
Tunisian style revolt are being tried in Zimbabwe.449  
Of course, utilization of the provisional measures rule is not without 
problems, and there have been cases where the African Union’s attempt to 
utilize the rule has failed.  For example, in 1994, the African Union 
attempted to use the provisional measures rule to intervene in another 
Nigerian case, involving Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa Jr. (Ken Saro Case).450  
Saro-Wiwa was a writer and activist, as well as the president of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People.451  Saro-Wiwa and a number 
of other defendants were arrested and charged with murdering four Ogoni 
leaders.452  The Nigerian government ignored the African Union’s repeated 
requests to stay the execution of the defendants in the Ken Saro Case and all 
defendants were eventually executed.453  Similarly, in Zegveld v. Eritrea, the 
African Commission concluded that Eritrea had violated Articles 2, 6, 7(1), 
and 9(2) of the African Charter when it detained eleven former government 
officials for criticizing the government.454  The African Commission 
requested that Eritrea release the prisoners.455  However, as of this writing, 
Eritrea has failed to release any of the prisoners and five of the eleven 
prisons are presumed dead.456 
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Arguably, the provisional measures rule allows the African Union to 
protect individual citizens and ensure that member states take steps to extend 
human and democratic rights to citizens.  While there have been a number of 
cases in which the use of the provisional measures rule was not successful,457 
the Nigeria Case illustrates that the provisional measures rule exemplifies a 
preexisting program or mechanism that the African Union could use more 
effectively and frequently to prevent human rights violations in Africa and 
ensure state compliance with the African Charter.  Thus, the African Union 
should publicize and signal its commitment to more quickly and effectively 
utilize the provisional measures rule by encouraging individuals, member 
states, and NGOs to submit communications and petitions to the African 
Commission whenever human rights are being violated.  
Additionally, Rule 93 of the Rules and Procedures of the African 
Commission requires that all available local remedies be utilized and 
exhausted prior to the African Commission’s review of a communication or 
petition,458 and Article 56, Section 5 of the African Charter provides that 
communications relating to human rights must be considered by the African 
Commission “after [exhaustion of all] local remedies . . . unless it is obvious 
that this procedure is unduly prolonged.”459  Yet, in some instances the 
African Commission may need to respond to communications and petitions 
by utilizing its provisional measures power to stop human rights violations 
before local remedies have been exhausted.  Moreover, given the paltry 
human rights track record of a number of member states, local remedies are 
unlikely to be impartial, timely, or effective.460  Thus, Commission Rule 93 
and Article 56, Section 5 of the African Charter should be revised to permit 
the African Commission to review communications and petitions prior to 
exhaustion of local remedies in grave circumstances.   
It should be noted that the African Commission has held that it “does not 
believe that the condition [requiring local remedies to be] exhausted can be 
applied literally to those cases in which it is ‘neither practicable nor 
desirable’ for the . . . victims to pursue such” local remedies.461  Additionally, 
in 2010 the rules of procedure were amended to provide that, if local 
remedies have not been exhausted, an individual must provide and allege 
specific grounds that support the contention that domestic remedies are 
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impossible or unavailable.462  However, the existence of the exhaustion-of-
local-remedies requirement in Article 56 of the African Charter and in the 
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission may deter individual African 
citizens from submitting communications that evidence human rights 
violations to the African Commission.  Furthermore, and most importantly, 
the African Union must terminate its practice of belatedly adopting 
prophylactic measures in an attempt to correct inadequately drafted 
governing documents.   
Institutionalists contend that human rights violations occur when a human 
rights regime is unable to provide unambiguous norms and rules for its 
member states to follow.463  As such, the African Union must clearly 
communicate its position on the exhaustion of local remedies, and the best 
way to do so is by amending the African Charter and Rule 93.  Thus, Article 
56, Section 5 of the African Charter and Rule 93 should be revised by 
defining circumstances in which the Commission may intervene prior to 
exhaustion of local remedies.  From a realist perspective, and in order to 
ensure that states comply with the African Commission’s provisional 
measures recommendations, the Assembly should be prepared to issue 
sanctions in grave circumstances against recalcitrant member states that fail 
to comply with these recommendations (although African Commission 
recommendations may be nonbinding on member states).464 
D.  Individual and NGO Access to the African Court 
In an effort to ensure the development of a cohesive human rights 
jurisprudence in Africa, the African Union adopted The Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Court Protocol) in 
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2008.465  The Court Protocol merged the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Human Rights Court) and the Court of Justice of the 
African Union to establish the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(African Court).466  The Court Protocol will come into effect after fifteen 
states have ratified the protocol.467  As of August 6, 2010, Libya, Burkina 
Faso, and Mali were the only African states to have ratified the Court 
Protocol.468  Until the Court Protocol becomes effective, the Human Rights 
Court is the adjudicatory body responsible for hearing cases involving 
violations of the African Charter.469 
Article 30(f) through Article 8(3) of the Court Protocol require that 
member states make a declaration accepting the African Court in order for 
court to hear a complaint from an individual or NGO.470  Thus, unless a state 
makes this declaration the African Court has no jurisdiction to hear a case 
brought by an individual or an NGO.  A similar declaration must be made by 
member states under the protocol establishing the Human Rights Court.471  
To date, only the following five countries have made the special declaration 
permitting individual and NGO access to the Human Rights Court: Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Mali.472  Given that only five member 
states have made special declarations under the protocol establishing the 
Human Rights Court, which was established in 1998 and entered into force 
in 2004,473 member states are unlikely to make the declaration necessary to 
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permit individual and NGO access to the African Court once the African 
Court becomes effective.   The importance of obtaining individual and NGO 
access to a regional human rights court has been well documented.474  From 
an institutionalist perspective, NGOs and individuals often times play a 
crucial role in monitoring state compliance with human rights norms by 
bringing human rights violations to the attention of the applicable human 
rights regime, thereby permitting a human rights regime to hold abusive 
states accountable for violations of human rights, especially when the state is 
unwilling to acknowledge or address its own violations.475 
Moreover, institutionalists posit that state compliance with the norms of a 
human rights regime will be greatest in regions where the human rights 
regimes are strong, for example, the EU system.  Further, institutionalists 
assert that state compliance may be obtained by increasing the cost of 
cheating and creating greater interdependence among states.476  The provision 
of the Court Protocol that prevents individual and NGO access to the African 
Court is contrary to the approach taken by the European Court of Human 
Rights, which granted individuals the ability to have direct access to the 
court in 1998.477  Individual access to the European Court of Human Rights 
has arguably increased the ability of the Council of Europe to hold 
noncompliant states accountable and ensure the protection of human rights. 
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In fact, Laurence Hefler has argued that “the individual complaints 
mechanism of the [European Court of Human Rights] is the crown jewel of 
the world’s most advanced international system for protecting civil and 
political liberties.478  From an institutionalist perspective, allowing 
individuals and NGOs unfettered access to file complaints before the African 
Court would provide additional protection against state sanctioned human 
rights violations.  Further, unfettered access would improve the ability of the 
African Union to hold member states accountable for violations of the human 
rights and democratic principles contained in the African Charter and 
Constitutive Act, thereby increasing the cost of cheating.  As such, the Court 
Protocol should be revised to eliminate the need for a special state 
declaration authorizing individual and NGO access to the African Court.  
Additionally, since the Court Protocol has not yet entered into force, the 
Human Rights Court is the adjudicatory body that is currently responsible for 
hearing cases related to violations of the rights contained in the African 
Charter.479  As previously mentioned, the protocol establishing the Human 
Rights Court also requires a special state declaration to permit individual and 
NGO access to the court.480  Therefore, in order to allow individual and NGO 
access to the currently operational Human Rights Court, the protocol 
establishing the Human Rights Court should be amended to remove the 
requirement for a special declaration by member states. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
While the OAU fulfilled its goal of eradicating colonialism in Africa and 
apartheid in South Africa, it failed to provide adequate human rights 
protections to African peoples.  The African Union is attempting to succeed 
where the OAU has failed. From both an institutionalist and realist 
perspective, the African Union has achieved success in resolving political 
crises and ensuring state compliance with the African Charter and 
Constitutive Act in smaller countries such as Guinea.  Unfortunately, the 
African Union’s feeble and ineffective response to the political and 
humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe, Libya, and Kenya indicates that the 
African Union still has a long way to go in order to provide regional human 
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rights protection and obtain member state compliance with the African 
Charter and Constitutive Act.  
Recent events in a number of African countries indicate that the African 
Union will need to address the many problems and issues outlined in this 
Article—including limited exercise of political will, failure to timely and 
uniformly impose sanctions, state reporting failures, and inadequately drafted 
governing instruments—in order to effectively resolve new and ongoing 
crises.  For example, Guinea-Bissau averted an attempted coup on December 
26, 2011; however, President Malam Bacai Sanha died of natural causes in a 
Paris clinic in January of 2012.481  Guinea-Bissau eventually suffered another 
military coup in April 2012.482  Similarly, the situation in Madagascar is 
ongoing.  As recently as January 21, 2012, and in violation of the political 
roadmap that was executed to resolve the crisis, Rajoelina prevented former 
president Ravalomanana’s return to Madagascar.483  On June 14, 2012, 
Rajoelina finally agreed to meet with Ravalomanana to address unresolved 
issues in the hopes of putting an end to the ongoing crisis.484  
The African Union’s ability to effectively resolve current crises by 
ensuring that these countries not only comply with all applicable peace 
agreements, but also comply with the African Charter and Constitutive Act, 
remains to be seen.  One thing is clear, however: if the African Union intends 
to succeed where the OAU has failed, it must adequately address its efficacy 
issues so that it can obtain member state compliance with the human rights 
and democratic principles set forth in the African Charter and Constitutive 
Act. 
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